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ARTICLES
How Hard Can This Be?
The Dearth of U.S. Tax Treaties with
Latin America
PATRICIA A. BROWN *
The United States has fewer tax treaties with countries
in Latin America and the Caribbean than the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Spain and even China have with
such countries. After first describing ways in which tax treaties reduce barriers to cross-border trade and investment,
this Article considers in turn various possible explanations
for this situation. It examines, and rejects, the hypothesis
that Latin American countries are reluctant to enter into tax
treaties in general. It then considers, and rejects, the possibility that Latin American countries are opposed to increased trade and investment from the United States in particular. It then considers the possibility that U.S. tax treaty
policy presents insurmountable difficulties to the conclusion
of tax treaties. It concludes that U.S. tax treaty policies may
present obstacles to successful negotiations with some, but
not all, Latin American countries, suggesting that the United
States might make more progress by negotiating with some
smaller countries if progress cannot be made with, for example, Brazil or Argentina.

Patricia A. Brown is the Director of Graduate Programs in Taxation and
Taxation of Cross-Border Investment at the University of Miami School of Law.
*
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INTRODUCTION
The United States has fifty-eight comprehensive bilateral tax
treaties 1 covering sixty-six countries. However, only five 2 are with
countries in Latin America or the Caribbean (“LATAM”). 3 Tax treaties have been described as “[t]he primary means for eliminating tax
See United States Income Tax Treaties – A to Z, INTERNAL REVENUE
SERV., https://www.irs.gov/businesses/international-businesses/united-states-income-tax-treaties-a-to-z (last visited Jan. 20, 2020) (listing all of the countries
with which the United States has a tax treaty). Nine of those countries (Armenia,
Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan
and Uzbekistan) are described as “former Soviet Republics which are now covered by the treaty with the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), formerly
known as the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics” E.g., Belarus – Tax Treaty
Documents, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/businesses/international-businesses/belarus-tax-treaty-documents (last visited Jan. 20, 2020) (accounting for the discrepancy between the number of treaties and the number of
countries covered). The site also includes links to several versions of the U.S.
Model Income Tax Convention. United States Income Tax Treaties – A to Z, supra.
2
See Convention Between the Government of the United States of America
and the Government of Trinidad and Tobago for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income, and the
Encouragement of International Trade and Investment, Trin. & Tobago-U.S., Jan.
9, 1970, 22 U.S.T. 164, T.I.A.S. No. 7047; Convention Between the Government
of the United States of America and the Government of Jamaica for the Avoidance
of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes
on Income, Jam.-U.S., May 21, 1980, 33 U.S.T. 2865, T.I.A.S. No. 10,206; Convention Between Barbados and the United States of America for the Avoidance
of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes
on Income, Barb.-U.S., Dec. 31, 1984, T.I.A.S. No. 11,090; Convention Between
the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the
United Mexican States for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention
of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income, Together with a Related Protocol, Mex.-U.S., Sep. 18, 1992, S. TREATY DOC. No. 103-7 (1992) [hereinafter
Mex.-U.S. Convention]; Convention Between the Government of the United
States of America and the Government of the Republic of Venezuela for the
Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect
to Taxes on Income and Capital, U.S.-Venez., Jan. 25, 1999, T.I.A.S. No. 13,020
[hereinafter U.S.-Venez. Convention].
3
The extension to the Netherlands Antilles of the Convention between the
United States of America and the Kingdom of the Netherlands for the Avoidance
of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with respect to Taxes on
Income and Certain Other Taxes was partially terminated, effective as of January
1, 1988, except with respect to interest and related articles. Convention Between
1
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barriers to trade and investment.” 4 If the purpose of tax treaties is to
eliminate tax barriers to cross-border trade and investment, one
would expect the United States—one of the major investors in
LATAM 5—to have more tax treaties with countries in the region.
This Article will explore the differences in tax treaty policy and
other circumstances that have created this situation.
Part I of this Article will describe, in general terms, the purpose
of tax treaties. Part II will examine the possibility that LATAM
countries are reluctant to enter into bilateral tax treaties. Part III will
discuss U.S. policies that may prevent the conclusion of treaties with
LATAM countries. Part IV will discuss several case studies regarding both successful and less successful negotiations and how lessons
drawn from these negotiations may inform future negotiations with
LATAM treaty partners. This Article ends with some conclusions
about the prospects for additional tax treaties between the United
States and LATAM countries.
I.
WHY ARE BILATERAL TAX TREATIES NECESSARY?
Tax treaties serve several purposes, including establishing
thresholds for taxation, reducing withholding tax rates on residents
the United States of America and the Netherlands with Respect to Taxes on Income and Certain Other Taxes, Neth.-U.S., Apr. 29, 1948, 62 Stat. 1757; U.S.
DEP’T OF STATE, PUB. NO. 9433, 8, at 162 (1988). The remaining articles were
effectively terminated by the Protocol between the Government of the United
State of America and the Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands in respect of the Netherlands Antilles Amending Article VIII of the 1948 Convention
with respect to Taxes on Income and Certain Other Taxes as Applicable to the
Netherlands Antilles, subject to a grandfather clause that protected certain bonds
that had been issued through Antilles subsidiaries of U.S. companies. Protocol
Between the Government of the United States of American and the Government
of the Kingdom of the Netherlands in Respect of the Netherlands Antilles Amending Article VIII of the 1948 Convention with Respect to Taxes on Income and
Certain Other Taxes as Applicable to the Netherlands Antilles, Neth.-U.S., Oct.
10, 1995, S. TREATY DOC. No. 104-23 (1996).
4
Treaties: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 108th Cong.
6 (2004) [hereinafter 2004 Treaties Hearing] (statement of Barbara M. Angus,
International Tax Counsel of the United States Treasury).
5
See U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, World Investment Report
2019, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/WIR/2019, at 48 (2019), https://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2019_en.pdf.
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of the treaty countries so as to avoid “excessive” taxation, providing
a treaty mechanism for relief of double taxation, and establishing
some minimal protections against discriminatory treatment by one
treaty party of residents or nationals of the other. 6
To a great extent, most modern tax treaties follow the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (“OECD”)
Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital (“OECD
Model”) 7 or the United Nations Model Double Taxation Convention
between Developed and Developing Countries (“U.N. Model”), 8
which itself is based on the OECD Model. The distributive articles
of the OECD Model—starting with Income from Immovable Property in Article 6 and ending around Article 21 with Other Income—
establish a series of rules that may allow one country (frequently
referred to as the “source” country, but sometimes the “host” or
“paying” country) to tax a resident of the other country if certain
thresholds are met. 9 In some cases, the non-resident country is provided an unlimited right to tax.10 In other cases, the non-resident
country is prohibited from taxing. 11 And in others, the non-resident
country is permitted to tax but at a specified maximum rate or only
if certain thresholds are met regarding in-State activity. 12
In general, if the non-resident State is provided the right to tax,
then the resident State is required to relieve double taxation. 13 The
OECD Model specifies two methods for relieving double taxation.14
Under Article 23A, the resident State will exempt from taxation the
Tax Treaties: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 109th
Cong. 7–8 (2006) [hereinafter Tax Treaties Hearing] (statement of Patricia A.
Brown, Deputy International Tax Counsel (Treaty Affairs), U.S. Dep’t of the
Treasury).
7
OECD, MODEL TAX CONVENTION ON INCOME AND CAPITAL: CONDENSED
VERSION, intro., para. 13 (2017) [hereinafter OECD MODEL TAX CONVENTION].
8
Dep’t of Econ. & Social Affairs, United Nations, Model Double Taxation
Convention Between Developed and Developing Countries, U.N. Doc.
ST/ESA/PAD/SER.E/213, at iii, ¶¶ 2, 18 (2017) [hereinafter U.N. Model Tax
Convention].
9
OECD MODEL TAX CONVENTION, supra note 7, arts. 6–21.
10
Id. intro., ¶ 20.
11
Id.
12
Id.
13
Id. intro., ¶ 19.
14
Id.
6
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income that may be taxed in the other State. 15 Alternatively, a “Contracting State” may choose the credit method of Article 23B, reducing the resident State tax dollar-for-dollar for the taxes paid to the
other State. 16 The OECD Model provides that even countries that
generally use the exemption method for relieving double taxation
may choose to retain their taxing rights with respect to items of income taxed on a withholding basis by the source State, by using the
credit method for withholding taxes. 17
Although the formal structure of these provisions is quite consistent from treaty to treaty, the details can vary considerably. 18 Capital importing countries, whether developed or developing, frequently argue for higher withholding rates on dividends, interest,
royalties, and so-called technical services 19 than the capital exporting countries, which are required to relieve double taxation, would
prefer. 20 Countries that import goods and services may argue to expand taxing rights by adopting different thresholds for taxation. 21
To the extent that these goals are achieved by limiting the source
country’s right to tax, they can be affected through standardized provisions that are more or less the same across the more than three
thousand bilateral tax treaties currently in force around the world. 22
However, in order to effectively mesh one country’s tax system with
Id. art. 23A, ¶ 1. Article 23A allows for “exemption with progression” so
that the marginal rate applicable to other non-exempt income takes into account
the exempt income. Id. art. 23A, ¶ 3; see also id. cmt. 9. For example, Individual
X earns $100 from business activities in Country S and $100 from business activities in Country R, his State of residence. The marginal tax rate in Country R is
20% for the first $150 of income, but 30% for income in excess of $150. Under
the Country S-Country R tax treaty, Country R must exempt the $100 earned in
Country S from taxation, but it may apply the 30% rate to $50 of Individual X’s
income.
16
Id. art. 23B, ¶ 1.
17
Id. art. 23A, ¶ 2; see also id., cmt. ¶ 47.
18
See Martin Hearson, Measuring Tax Treaty Negotiation Outcomes: The
Action Aid Tax Treaties Dataset 10–11 (Int’l Ctr. for Tax & Dev., Working Paper
No. 47, 2016).
19
U.N. Model Tax Convention, supra note 8, art. 12A.
20
See Hearson, supra note 18, at 9, 11.
21
Compare, e.g., OECD MODEL TAX CONVENTION, supra note 7, arts. 5, 7
(providing more limited taxing rights), with U.N. Model Tax Convention, supra
note 8, arts. 5, 7 (providing more expansive taxing rights).
22
Yariv Brauner, Treaties in the Aftermath of BEPS, 41 BROOKLYN J. INT'L
L. 973, 975 (2016).
15
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another, so as to avoid double taxation 23 and double non-taxation24
and to achieve the agreed-upon allocation of tax revenues, treaty negotiators must frequently modify the taxation of their own residents
through more customized provisions that deviate not only from the
standardized treaty provisions, but also from their own domestic tax
laws. 25
One of the most common ways in which U.S. treaties modify the
treatment of U.S. residents in order to alleviate double taxation is by
modifying source rules, which otherwise can limit the foreign tax
credit available under U.S. domestic law. 26 A version included in
many U.S. treaties provides that, if the treaty allows the other Contracting State to tax an item of gross income, as defined under U.S.
See, e.g., Convention Between the Government of the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the United States of
America for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital Gains, U.K.-U.S., at 286–
87, July, 24, 2001, 2224 U.N.T.S. 247 [hereinafter U.K.-U.S. Convention) (addressing conflicts between the grantor trust rules of the United States and the settlor trust rules of the United Kingdom).
24
See, e.g., Convention Between the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the
Kingdom of Belgium for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention
of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital, art. 18, Neth.Bel., June 5, 2001, 2205 U.N.T.S. 385 (allowing the source State to tax pension
income if the residence State does not tax such income fully).
25
See Income Tax Treaties: Hearing Before the H.R. Subcomm. on Oversight
of the Comm. on Ways and Means, 96th Cong. 115 (1980) [hereinafter Income
Tax Treaties] (statement of H. David Rosenbloom, Treasury International Tax
Counsel, Department of the Treasury) (“The code paints a broad picture for use
with all countries. The treaties, as I see it, provide the necessary refinement on a
country-by-country basis. I don’t think it is possible as a statutory matter to address all the multitude of tax systems that we encounter throughout the world.”).
Many of these customized provisions are found in treaties with the United States’
most important treaty partners—the United Kingdom and Canada—because the
sheer volume of trade and investment highlights problems relatively quickly and
creates a significant incentive to solve them. See, e.g., U.K.-U.S. Convention, supra note 23; Convention Between the United States of America and Canada With
Respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital, Can.-U.S., art. XXI, Sept. 26, 1980,
T.I.A.S. No. 11087 [hereinafter Can.-U.S. Convention].
26
DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, TECHNICAL EXPLANATION ACCOMPANYING THE
UNITED STATES MODEL INCOME TAX CONVENTION OF NOV. 15, 2006, at 74
(2006),
https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Documents/hp16802.pdf; see also H. David Rosenbloom, U.S. Source Rules: Building
Blocks of Cross-Border Taxation, 60 BULL. INT’L TAX’N 386, 386–87 (2006).
23
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law, derived by a resident of the U.S, the U.S. will treat that item of
gross income as gross income from sources within the other Contracting State for U.S. foreign tax credit purposes. 27 This provision
is intended to ensure that a U.S. resident can obtain a U.S. foreign
tax credit for taxes paid to the other Contracting State when the
treaty assigns primary taxing rights over an item of gross income to
that State. 28
The importance of re-sourcing rules has occasionally been overlooked. 29 However, the lack of such rules can frustrate the intentions
of the treaty negotiators. For example, Article 5(5) of the 1992 tax
treaty between the United States and Mexico provides that a foreign
enterprise could be taxed in the host country if a person in the host
country “habitually processes in the first-mentioned State on behalf
of the enterprise goods or merchandise maintained in that State by
that enterprise, provided that such processing is carried on using assets furnished, directly or indirectly, by that enterprise or any associated enterprise.” 30 The rule would allow Mexico to treat U.S. companies that use Mexican assembly plants (“maquiladoras”) 31 as having permanent establishments in Mexico. 32 However, under U.S. doSee DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, UNITED STATES MODEL INCOME TAX
CONVENTION, art. 23 (2016) [hereinafter U.S. MODEL TAX CONVENTION].
28
See, e.g., DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF THE
CONVENTION BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND
NORTHERN IRELAND FOR THE AVOIDANCE OF DOUBLE TAXATION AND THE
PREVENTION OF FISCAL EVASION WITH RESPECT TO TAXES ON INCOME AND ON
CAPITAL GAINS 97–98 (2003), https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/treaties/Documents/teus-uk.pdf (discussing paragraph 2 of article 24 of the
Convention).
29
See, e.g., Rosenbloom, supra note 26, at 389–90.
30
Mex.-U.S. Convention, supra note 2, art. 5, ¶ 5.
31
See James F. Smith & Chris Kraul, U.S., Mexico Reach Deal on Factory
Tax, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 30, 1999, 12:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1999-oct-30-mn-27797-story.html.
32
See DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF THE
CONVENTION AND PROTOCOL BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICAN AND THE GOVERNMENT OF UNITED MEXICAN STATES FOR
THE AVOIDANCE OF DOUBLE TAXATION AND THE PREVENTION OF FISCAL
EVASION WITH RESPECT TO TAXES ON INCOME 10 (1994),
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-trty/mexicotech.pdf (discussing Paragraph 5 of Article 5 of the Convention; “This subparagraph is meant to clarify that a dependent
27
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mestic rules, income earned through those permanent establishments would have been treated as U.S.-source income, potentially
exposing the companies to double taxation.33 Article 24(3) of the
Mexico-U.S. treaty was modified in 2002 to ensure that the United
States would provide relief from double taxation if Mexico taxed a
U.S. company in accordance with Article 5(5) of the treaty. 34
The U.S.-Venezuela treaty dealt with similar issues with source
rules. 35 At the time of the treaty negotiations, Venezuela had a territorial system under which it taxed residents and non-residents only
on income arising from sources in Venezuela. 36 Because Venezuela
could tax only income from sources within Venezuela, there was an
obvious incentive for them to take a broad view of what constituted
Venezuelan-source income. 37 That resulted, for example, in Venezuela imposing withholding taxes on payments for certain services
performed by U.S. persons in the United States. 38 Under U.S. domestic law, the income earned from services performed in the
United States is from U.S. sources. 39 U.S. foreign tax credit limitations are intended to ensure that foreign taxes do not reduce U.S.
taxation on U.S. source income. 40 Accordingly, unless the recipient
of such income also had low-taxed foreign source income from other
agent that processes inventory of its principal using assets of the principal (or a
related enterprise) without itself having ownership of either the inventory or the
assets used in the processing, represents a permanent establishment of the principal. This is the case whether or not the dependent agent is a subsidiary of the U.S.
enterprise. Because such an agent represents a permanent establishment, the income and assets attributable to its activity are subject to income and assets tax in
Mexico.”).
33
See Smith & Kraul, supra note 31.
34
DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF THE PROTOCOL
BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE
GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED MEXICAN STATES 15 (2002), https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/treaties/Documents/temexico.pdf.
35
See JESSE HELMS, S. COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, TAX CONVENTION
WITH VENEZUELA, S. EXEC. REP. NO. 106-6, at 9 (1999), https://www.congress.gov/106/crpt/erpt6/CRPT-106erpt6.pdf.
36
See id. at 8 (discussing the “Venezuelan Territorial Tax System”).
37
Id. at 9–10.
38
Id. at 9.
39
See id.
40
DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, PUB. 514, FOREIGN TAX CREDIT FOR
INDIVIDUALS, at 3 (2018), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p514.pdf [hereinafter
PUB. 514] (discussing the U.S. foreign tax credit).
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activities, those U.S. taxpayers could have been subject to double
taxation with respect to amounts received from Venezuela. 41 A
treaty can prevent double taxation in that case by providing that
Venezuela cannot tax income from “business profits” of the service
provider unless that service provider has a “permanent establishment” in Venezuela. 42
Another area where domestic law may be too blunt an instrument is in the treatment of pensions. The OECD Model provides that
pensions should be taxable in the state of residence of the recipient
of the pension. 43 For example, Individual R has worked all his life
for a company that is a resident of Australia, during which he contributed to the company’s defined contribution retirement plan. Australia taxes pensions under a “TTE” system—there is no tax deduction or exemption when contributions are made (“T”), the investment income of the fund is taxed (“T”) (albeit at a concessionary
rate) and distributions from the fund to the beneficiary are not taxed
at all (“E”). 44 Individual R would like to retire to the United States
where his children and grandchildren are living. However, the
United States generally taxes pensions under an EET system, pursuant to which contributions to a pension fund are deductible (“E”),
investment income of the pension fund is not taxable (“E”), but distributions are taxed (“T”). 45 If Individual R moved to the United
States, he would be subject to the equivalent of double taxation because he would have been taxed in Australia, either on the value of
the contributions made by his employer or on the full value of his
compensation without deduction for contributions Individual R

See S. EXEC. REP. NO. 106-6, at 9.
See id. at 22. Alternatively, a treaty could provide for a source State taxing
right, but also include a re-sourcing rule for any gross income taxed by the source
State. See id. at 55.
43
OECD MODEL TAX CONVENTION, supra note 7, art. 18.
44
See OECD PROJECT ON FINANCIAL INCENTIVES & RETIREMENT SAVINGS,
THE TAX TREATMENT OF RETIREMENT SAVINGS IN PRIVATE PENSION PLANS 1–2
(2018), https://www.oecd.org/daf/fin/private-pensions/Tax-treatment-of-retirement-savings-Policy-Brief-1.pdf; see also Rhys Cormick & John A. McLaren,
The Current Retirement System in Australia Needs to be More Attuned to a Mobile
International Workforce: A Case for Reform, 29 AUSTRALIAN TAX FORUM 493,
499–500 (2014).
45
McLaren, supra note 44, at 499–501.
41
42
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made, and taxed a second time in the United States on the distributions received from the pension fund. 46 In this case, the tax treaty
between Australia and the United States does not include a provision
that would prevent the United States from taxing any pension to the
extent that it would be exempt in the other country. 47
The provisions implicated in the preceding examples in this Section are some of those that affect trade in goods and services, as opposed to investment. Early tax treaties were primarily about ensuring the appropriate allocation of profits from business activities, particularly when defunct empires begat newly-independent countries. 48 Businesses selling goods into, or providing services in, another country rely on Articles 5 and 7 of the OECD Model, which
generally provide that the business profits of an enterprise may be
subject to taxation in the host State only when the business has a
“permanent establishment” in that State. 49 Article 8 prevents a host
State from taxing profits that arise from the operation of ships or
aircraft in international traffic, even if the relevant enterprise has a
permanent establishment in the host State. 50 The “closed system” 51
of taxing income from employment is found in Articles 15 through
19. 52 The rule that ensures that business executives attending meetings in another State are not subject to tax therein is in Article
15(2). 53 Articles 9 and 25 provide principles for the allocation of

Cf. id. (discussing taxation on pensions in Australia and the United States).
Compare Convention Between the Government of the United States of
America and the Government of Australia for the Avoidance of Double Taxation
and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income, Austl.U.S., arts. 18–19, Aug. 6, 1982, 35 U.S.T. 1999, T.I.A.S. No. 10,773, with U.S.
MODEL TAX CONVENTION, supra note 27, art. 17(1)(b).
48
See Convention for the Purpose of Avoiding Double Taxation Between
Austria, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Roumania and the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats
and Slovenes, art. 2–4, April 6, 1922, reprinted in LEAGUE OF NATIONS, DOUBLE
TAXATION AND FISCAL EVASION: COLLECTION OF INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS
AND INTERNAL LEGAL PROVISIONS FOR THE PREVENTION OF DOUBLE TAXATION
AND FISCAL EVASION 73, 73–74 (1928).
49
See OECD MODEL TAX CONVENTION, supra note 7, arts. 5, 7.
50
See id., art. 8.
51
See Frank P.G. Pötgens, The “Closed System” of the Provisions on Income
from Employment in the OECD Model, 41 EUROPEAN TAX’N 252, 252 (2001).
52
OECD MODEL TAX CONVENTION, supra note 7, arts. 15–19.
53
Id., art. 15, ¶ 2.
46
47
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income between jurisdictions and a mechanism to resolve disagreements between the countries over such allocations. 54
Article 5, in its current form, allows an enterprise to sell into a
jurisdiction without becoming subject to taxation there, unless the
enterprise has a physical presence there or a person in the host jurisdiction with the authority to bind the enterprise. 55 Even if the enterprise has a physical presence or person with binding authority in the
host State, it will still not be subject to taxation in that State if its
activities in the host State fall within a category of “preparatory or
auxiliary” activities. 56 Treaties based on the U.N. Model expand
these rules somewhat, particularly to deal with the provision of services. 57 Nevertheless, millions of cross-border transactions take
place every day under the protection of these provisions. 58
Imagine a world in which airlines and shipping companies were
subject to taxation in every jurisdiction in which they landed or
docked. The allocation of income between hundreds of jurisdictions
would be difficult, to say the least. For that reason, agreements allocating taxation rights only to the State of residence or otherwise
denying taxing rights to the host State were entered into as early as
the 1920s. 59 Some might argue that the existence of such agreements
obviates the need for tax treaties with respect to transportation activities. However, such agreements do not resolve all the issues arising from the operation of such enterprises in multiple jurisdictions.
For example, such enterprises may engage in activities beyond those

Id., arts. 9, 25.
Id., art. 5, ¶¶ 1–2, 4–6.
56
Id., art. 5, ¶ 4.
57
See, e.g., U.N. Model Tax Convention, supra note 8, art. 5, cmt. ¶ 9.
58
See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., OECD WORK ON TAXATION
14 (2018), https://www.oecd.org/tax/centre-for-tax-policy-and-administrationbrochure.pdf (“Today [the OECD Model] forms the basis of a network of around
3,000 tax treaties globally, reducing the tax barriers to cross-border trade and investment, as well as assisting in the prevention of tax avoidance and evasion.”).
59
See, e.g., Double Taxation: Shipping Profits, Swed.-U.S., Aug. 9, 1922, 11
Stat. 746; Reciprocal Exemption from Taxation of Air Transport Profits, U.K.Neth., Aug. 27, 1936, http://foto.archivalware.co.uk/data/Library2/pdf/1936TS0026.pdf.
54
55
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exempted under domestic law or such limited shipping agreements. 60 Tax treaties may provide a broader exemption for such activities.
Even if such enterprises are not subject to taxation on their own
profits in the host State, the situation may be different with respect
to the enterprises’ employees. 61 If the employees are subject to tax
in the host State, the employer may have withholding obligations.62
In 2005, the trade association representing Latin American airlines
complained that the U.S. Internal Revenue Service was auditing the
airlines with respect to their flight crews’ income allocable to the
United States that exceeded the exemptions provided in U.S. domestic law. 63 The version of Article 14 included in the U.S. Model Income Tax Convention would have prevented U.S. taxation of such
flight crew members if they were residents of countries with which
the United States had tax treaties. 64
Some of these problems may be obvious from the beginning of
discussions between potential treaty partners, while others may become clear during negotiations, and some only appear once the
treaty relationship is established. The United States and Canada, for

For example, section 883 of the Internal Revenue Code applies to foreign
corporations that are “considered engaged in the international operation of ships
or aircraft.” I.R.C. § 883-1(c)(1) (2018). On the other hand, the U.S. Model Article. 8(3) applies to stand-alone container leasing companies. See DEP’T OF
TREASURY, TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF THE CONVENTION BETWEEN THE
GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF
THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND FOR THE
AVOIDANCE OF DOUBLE TAXATION AND THE PREVENTION OF FISCAL EVASION
WITH RESPECT TO TAXES ON INCOME AND ON CAPITAL GAINS 32 (2002),
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/treaties/Documents/teusuk.pdf (noting, in respect to Article 8(3), that “[t]his result obtains under paragraph 3 regardless of whether the recipient of the income is engaged in the operation of ships or aircraft in international traffic . . . .”).
61
See, e.g., Caroline Daniel, Airlines Fear U.S. Income Tax Claim,
FINANCIAL TIMES, Feb. 16, 2005, at 7 (discussing how the IRS claims Latin American airlines may owe taxes for employees when flying over and conducting preflight services in the United States).
62
See id.
63
See id.
64
See U.S. MODEL TAX CONVENTION, supra note 27, art. 14.
60
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example, have entered into five protocols to the 1980 tax treaty between the two countries. 65 Having a treaty relationship already in
place allows for the resolution of emerging issues more quickly. 66
Because the rules affecting trade are generally more standardized, more attention tends to be focused on the withholding rates
applicable to dividends, interest, and royalties, which affect crossborder investment. 67 In particular, multinational corporations generally are concerned about the “excessive” taxation that they may suffer because source countries impose gross-basis withholding
taxes. 68 A representative of U.S.-based multinationals testified:
In addition, the tax systems of most countries impose
withholding taxes, frequently at high rates, on payments of dividends, interest, and royalties to foreigners, and treaties are the mechanism by which these
taxes are lowered on a bilateral basis. If U.S. enterprises earning such income abroad cannot enjoy the
reduced foreign withholding rates offered by a tax
treaty, they are liable to suffer excessive and noncreditable levels of foreign tax and to be at a competitive disadvantage relative to traders and investors
from other countries that do have such benefits. Tax
treaties serve to prevent this barrier to U.S. participation in international commerce. 69
Those sentiments were echoed by a representative of foreignbased multinationals with U.S. subsidiaries:
Protocol Amending the Convention Between the United States of America
and Canada with Respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital, Can.-U.S., at V–
VI, Sept. 21, 2007, S. TREATY DOC. No. 110-15 (2008) (listing the prior protocols
to the agreement).
66
See Tax Treaties Hearing, supra note 6, at 3 (statement of Patricia A.
Brown, Deputy International Tax Counsel (Treaty Affairs), U.S. Department of
the Treasury).
67
See The Japanese Tax Treaty (T. Doc. 108-14) and the Sri Lanka Tax Protocol (T. Doc. 108-9): Hearing Before the S, Comm. of Foreign Relations, 108
Cong. 31 (2004) (statement of Barbara M. Angus, International Tax Counsel,
United States Department of the Treasury).
68
See id. at 32.
69
Id. (statement of William A. Reinsch, President, National Foreign Trade
Council).
65
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Tax treaties help ensure that businesses are not taxed
twice on the same income while accounting for concerns of tax avoidance. This is done in part by reducing or eliminating withholding taxes on cross-border
income flows between affiliated companies. By ensuring that common business expenses like royalty
and interest payments are not subject to double taxation, tax treaties allow insourcing companies to invest more in the very business activities that drive
economic growth in the United States. 70
A potential treaty partner that has shown a willingness to reduce
withholding taxes in its negotiations with other countries is, therefore, much more likely to succeed at convincing the United States
to enter into tax treaty negotiations than one that has not.
II.

ARE LATAM COUNTRIES RELUCTANT TO ENTER INTO TAX
TREATIES?
There is a pervasive narrative that tax treaties are one-sided instruments of economic oppression foisted upon developing countries by developed countries. 71 Developing countries are urged to
decline to enter into tax treaties because (a) they are not necessary
to avoid double taxation and (b) they simply result in revenue transfers from developing countries to developed countries. 72 It is necessary, therefore, to consider whether the lack of tax treaties between
the United States and LATAM countries is attributable to a general
reluctance on the part of LATAM countries to enter into tax treaties.

Treaties: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 113th Cong.
(2014) [hereinafter 2014 Treaties Hearing] (statement of Nancy L. McLernon,
President & CEO Organization for International Investment), https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/022614AM_Hearing_Testimony%20%20Nancy_McLernon.pdf.
71
Tsilly Dagan, The Tax Treaties Myth, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 939,
990–93 (2000).
72
See id. at 990–91.
70
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In 2009, Sebastien Drevet and Victor Thuronyi compared the
treaty networks of UN member states with those of OECD members. 73 They found that the average number of tax treaties entered
into by OECD members was seventy-two, while the average number
of tax treaties entered into by non-OECD members was seventeen. 74
At the time, the LATAM country with the highest number of tax
treaties was Mexico, ranked fifty-fifth (tied with Armenia and Vietnam) with thirty-seven treaties. 75 Next was Brazil, ranked seventythird with twenty-eight treaties. 76 Barbados was seventy-fourth with
twenty-six. 77 Venezuela and Trinidad and Tobago were tied at eightieth (with Algeria and Bosnia and Herzegovina) with twenty-four
treaties each. 78 Jamaica was eighty-fifth and Chile was eightysixth. 79 At the time, Chile had twenty treaties and Argentina had
seventeen treaties. 80 Below the non-OECD member average were
Ecuador (14), Antigua and Barbuda (12), Guyana (12), St. Kitts and
Nevis (12), Dominica (12), St. Lucia (11), St. Vincent and the Grenadines (11), Bolivia (9), Cuba (7), Peru (5), Colombia (4), Uruguay
(2), the Dominican Republic (1), Panama (1), Paraguay (1), and Suriname (1). 81 The Bahamas, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala,
Honduras, and Nicaragua were all listed as having no tax treaties. 82
Drevet and Thuronyi compiled their tables using the tax treaty
database of the IBFD. 83 The database shows that, over the past decade, the number of treaties entered into by LATAM countries has
increased, in some cases significantly. Mexico now has sixty tax
treaties. 84 Chile now has thirty-three treaties, compared to twenty

See Sebastien A. Drevet & Victor Thuronyi, The Tax Treaty Network of
the U.N. Member States, 54 TAX NOTES INT’L 783, 783–84 (2009).
74
Id.
75
Id. at 785.
76
Id.
77
Id.
78
Id.
79
Id.
80
Id.
81
Id. at 785–86.
82
Id. at 786.
83
Id. at 785–86.
84
Mexico - Treaty Withholding Rates Table, Int’l Bureau for Fiscal Documentation (accessed Jan. 20, 2020).
73
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in 2009. 85 Uruguay has twenty-one, compared to its previous two. 86
Colombia has treaty relationships with twelve countries, more than
twice its prior four. 87 Peru has treaty relationships with ten countries, an increase from its previous five. 88 Ecuador has twenty, an
increase of six. 89 Brazil increased the number of its treaties to thirtythree from twenty-eight. 90 Argentina added three. 91 Bolivia continues to have nine. 92 Accordingly, the data does not seem to support
the idea of a general reluctance to enter into treaties as a significant
reason for the lack of tax treaties with the United States.
It is worth considering the treaty networks of these countries in
more depth. In many cases, a large proportion of a country’s treaty
network is made up of treaties with close neighbors and trading part-

Compare Chile - Treaty Withholding Rates Table, Int’l Bureau for Fiscal
Documentation (accessed Jan. 20, 2020), with Drevet & Thuronyi, supra note 73,
at 785. Chile currently has a treaty pending with the United States. See infra Section IV.B.3.
86
Compare Uruguay - Treaty Withholding Rates Table, Int’l Bureau for Fiscal Documentation (accessed Jan. 20, 2020), with Drevet & Thuronyi, supra note
73, at 785. In addition, Uruguay has four treaties that are currently pending. See
Uruguay, DELOITTE INT’L TAX SOURCE, https://dits.deloitte.com/#Jurisdiction/105 (last visited Jan. 20, 2020).
87
Compare Colombia - Treaty Withholding Rates Table, Int’l Bureau for Fiscal Documentation (accessed Jan. 20, 2020), and 2004 Andean Community Income and Capital Tax Convention, May 5, 2004, http://internationaltaxtreaty.com/download/bolivia/dtc/Andean%20Community-DTC-May-2004.pdf
(creating a tax treaty relationship among Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru),
with Drevet & Thuronyi, supra note 73, at 786.
88
Compare Peru - Treaty Withholding Rates Table, Int’l Bureau for Fiscal
Documentation, (accessed Jan. 20, 2020), with Drevet & Thuronyi, supra note 73,
at 786.
89
Compare Ecuador - Treaty Withholding Rates Table, Int’l Bureau for Fiscal Documentation, (accessed Jan. 20, 2020), with Drevet & Thuronyi, supra note
73, at 786.
90
Compare Brazil - Treaty Withholding Rates Table, Int’l Bureau for Fiscal
Documentation, (accessed Jan. 20, 2020), with Drevet & Thuronyi, supra note 73,
at 785.
91
Compare Argentina - Treaty Withholding Rates Table, Int’l Bureau for Fiscal Documentation, (accessed Jan. 20, 2020), with Drevet & Thuronyi, supra note
73, at 785.
92
Compare Bolivia - Treaty Withholding Rates Table, Int’l Bureau for Fiscal
Documentation, (accessed Jan. 20, 2020), with Drevet & Thuronyi, supra note 73,
at 786.
85
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ners. Peru has treaty relationships with Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, and Mexico. 93 Its other treaties are with Canada,
Korea, Portugal, and Switzerland. 94 Peru’s primary trading partners
are China, the United States, Brazil, Switzerland, Korea, Spain,
Mexico, and India. 95 In the case of Ecuador, seven of its twenty treaties are with other LATAM countries—Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, and Uruguay. 96 Ecuador’s non-LATAM treaties are with Belarus, Belgium, Canada, China, France, Germany,
Italy, Korea, Qatar, Romania, Russia, Singapore, Spain, and Switzerland. 97 Ecuador’s primary export trading partners are the United
States, Vietnam, Peru, Chile, Panama, Russia, and China. 98 Its primary import trading partners are the United States, China, Colombia, Panama, Brazil, and Peru. 99 Other treaties appear to be with
countries that are likely sources of investment capital. 100
It appears that a reasonable number of LATAM countries are
open to tax treaty negotiations and adept at choosing treaty partners
that are likely sources of trade or investment. LATAM countries are,
therefore, investing scarce negotiation resources on potential treaty

Peru - Treaty Withholding Rates Table, supra note 88.
Id.
95
World
Factbook:
Peru
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY,
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/pe.html (last
visited Jan. 20, 2020) (listing Peru’s import and export partners under “economy”
tab).
96
Ecuador - Treaty Withholding Rates Table, supra note 89.
97
Id.
98
World Factbook: Ecuador, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ec.html (last
visited Jan. 20, 2020) (listing Ecuador’s export partners under “economy” tab).
99
Id. (listing Ecuador’s import partners).
100
See, e.g., Table 1-o: Outward Direct Investment Positions, As of End-2018:
Reporting Economy: Germany, INT’L MONETARY FUND, http://data.imf.org/regular.aspx?key=61227424 (last visited Jan. 20, 2020) (listing Germany as having
invested $348 million in Ecuador); see also Ecuador, FRANCE DIPLOMATIE:
MINISTRY FOR EUROPE & FOREIGN AFFAIRS, https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/country-files/ecuador/ (last updated June 6, 2017) (“with a stock
of about US $500 million, France has positioned itself as the third-largest European investor over the past 15 years . . . .”).
93
94
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partners from which they are likely to see the most benefit. It is surprising, therefore, that the United States is not part of the treaty network in those countries. 101
There does not seem to be any desire to rebuff trade and investment from the United States. Nine LATAM countries—Argentina,
Bolivia, Ecuador, Grenada, Honduras, Jamaica, Panama, Trinidad
and Tobago, and Uruguay—have entered into Bilateral Investment
Treaties (“BITs”) with the United States. 102 BITs are intended “to
protect private investment, to develop market-oriented policies in
partner countries, and to promote U.S. exports.” 103 The United
States also has Free Trade Agreements (“FTAs”) in place with a
number of LATAM countries. 104 FTAs generally include the investor-protection provisions of BITs, along with additional provisions
regarding trade in goods and services. 105 LATAM countries that are
party to an FTA with the United States are Chile, Colombia, Costa
Rica, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras,
Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, and Peru. 106 Income taxes generally
are carved out of the trade disciplines imposed by BITs and FTAs,
the thought being that income taxes should be covered by tax treaties

United States - Treaty Withholding Rates Table, Int’l Bureau for Fiscal
Documentation, (accessed Jan. 20, 2020) (listing treaties only with those LATAM
countries listed in note 2, supra).
102
See Bilateral Investment Treaties Currently in Force, ENF’T &
COMPLIANCE, TRADE COMPLIANCE CTR., https://tcc.export.gov/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral_Investment_Treaties/index.asp (last visited Dec. 26, 2019).
103
Bilateral Investment Treaties, OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE
REPRESENTATIVE, https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/bilateral-investment-treaties
(last visited Dec. 16, 2019).
104
See Free Trade Agreements, ENF’T & COMPLIANCE, TRADE COMPLIANCE
CTR.,
https://tcc.export.gov/Trade_Agreements/Free_Trade_Agreements/index.asp (last visited Dec. 26, 2019).
105
Compare United States – Chile Free Trade Agreement ch. 10, June 6, 2003,
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/agreements/fta/chile/asset_upload_file1_4004.pdf, with the OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2012
U.S. MODEL BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY (2012), https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/BIT%20text%20for%20ACIEP%20Meeting.pdf.
106
Free Trade Agreements, OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE,
https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements (last visited Dec. 26,
2019) (listing all countries the United States has free trade agreements with).
101
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and not trade agreements. 107 The problem is that the tax treaties have
not materialized.
III.

THE U.S. PERSPECTIVE ON NEW TAX TREATIES.

A.
Economic Factors Affecting U.S. Tax Treaty Policy
The United States has a long history with income tax treaties,
having entered into comprehensive treaties with France 108 and Sweden 109 as long ago as the 1930s. U.S. tax treaty policy historically
reflects a general institutional interest in having an open economy
that favors cross-border trade and investment. 110 To the layperson,
“[t]ax treaties are important to the overall international economic
policy of the United States because they serve to reduce tax barriers
to international trade and investment.” 111
Although the United States is a capital-importing country, 112 it
is a net aggregate capital-exporter of foreign direct investment
107
See Hugh J. Ault & Jacques Sasseville, Taxation and Non-Discrimination:
A Reconsideration, 22 WORLD TAX J. 101, 119 (2010).
108
See Convention and Protocol Between the United States of America and
France, Fr.-U.S., Apr. 27, 1932, 49. Stat. 1345.
109
See Convention and Protocol Between the United States of America and
Sweden Respecting Double Taxation, U.S.-Swed., Mar. 23, 1939, 54 Stat. 1759.
110
Conventions and Protocols on Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income and Capital; Treaty
Doc. 103-29, Sweden; Treaty Doc. 103-30, Ukraine; Treaty Doc. 103-31, Mexico;
Treaty Doc. 103-32, France; Treaty Doc. 103-33, Kazakhstan; Treaty Doc. 10334, Portugal; Treaty Doc. 104-4, Canada: Hearing Before the Comm. on Foreign
Relations U.S. S., 104th Cong. 114 (1995) [hereinafter 1995 Hearing] (statement
of Alan P. Larson, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Economic and Business Affairs) (“There is reason to believe that tax policy and tax treaties are becoming more important elements of our international economic infrastructure. As
the pace of globalization intensifies and formal barriers to trade and investment
recede, tax treatment becomes an even greater factor in making trade and investment decisions.”).
111
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, Treasury Secretary John W. Snow
Remarks at the US-Japan Income Tax Treaty Signing Ceremony (Nov. 6, 2003),
https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/js975.aspx.
112
Steven Rattner, Unpacking the Trade Deficit, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 17, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/17/opinion/unpacking-the-trade-deficit.html
(“[C]apital can also be imported to make up for a lagging savings rate and even
to finance consumption. With the domestic savings rate low (in part because of a
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(“FDI”). 113 Portfolio debt, primarily corporate and government
bonds held by foreign investors, does not rely on treaty claims to
provide exemptions from U.S. withholding tax.114 However, treaties
are generally necessary to provide exemptions from withholding tax
for related party debt and reductions or exemptions from withholding tax on dividends and royalties. 115 As of the end of 2017, the total
amount of foreign direct investment into the United States was just
over $4 trillion, $3.3 trillion of which was equity investment. 116 U.S.
outward foreign direct investment was just over $6 trillion, with $5.8
trillion as equity. 117 A significant amount of South American investment in United States in particular consists of real property, 118 which
also is not affected by tax treaties as treaties generally allow unlimited taxation by the State of source. 119 Accordingly, with respect to
the income that tax treaties apply to, income flows generally favor
the United States.

federal budget deficit about to eclipse $1 trillion), we have — in most recent years
— been net borrowers.”).
113
Compare Table 1-o: Outward Direct Investment Positions, as of end-2017:
Reporting Economy: United States, INT’L MONETARY FUND, data.imf.org/regular.aspx?key=61227424 (last visited Dec. 26, 2019) [hereinafter Table 1-o:
United States], with Table 1-i: Inward Direct Investment Positions, as of end2017: Reporting Economy: United States, INT’L MONETARY FUND,
data.imf.org/regular.aspx?key=61227424 (last visited Dec. 26, 2019) [hereinafter
Table 1-i: United States].
114
See I.R.C. § 871(h), 881(c) (2018).
115
See id. § 882(c)(3); see also Jefferey L. Rubinger, Proposed U.S. Model
Treaty Provisions May Dramatically Alter International Tax Landscape, 89 FLA.
B.J. 54, 54 (2015).
116
See Table 1-o: United States, supra note 113.
117
See Table 1-i: United States, supra note 113.
118
According to the National Association of Realtors, LATAM accounted for
22% of foreign purchases of U.S. residential real estate in 2019, second only to
Asia and Oceania at 27%. LAWRENCE YUN & GAY CORORATON, NAT’L ASS’N OF
RELATORS, PROFILE OF INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS IN U.S. RESIDENTIAL
REAL ESTATE 14 (2019), https://www.nar.realtor/sites/default/files/documents/2019-profile-of-international-activity-in-u-s-residential-real-estate-07-172019.pdf.
119
See OECD MODEL TAX CONVENTION, supra note 7, art. 6
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Because payment flows generally favor the United States, 120 the
goal has been to reduce withholding taxes and other source taxation
as much as possible. 121 However, because it is not always possible
to achieve everything desired in a negotiation, the priorities with respect to reductions of withholding taxes have been royalties, interest, and dividends. 122
There are a number of reasons for the focus on eliminating
source-State taxation of royalties. The theoretical justification is that
royalties are generated by marketing or industrial intangibles, which
require substantial expenditures, either for research and development, in the case of industrial intangibles, or advertising and marketing, in the case of marketing intangibles. 123 Accordingly, royalties are more like business profits than a passive investment, such as
dividends or interest. 124 Perhaps even more important is the practical
reason that the United States encountered frequent disputes with
treaty partners over the definition of royalties and the source of royalties. 125 Eliminating the withholding tax on royalties seems to have

See Matthew Higgins & Thomas Klitgaard, Income Flows from U.S. Foreign Assets and Liabilities, LIBERTY ST. ECON. (Nov. 14, 2012), https://libertystreeteconomics.newyorkfed.org/2012/11/income-flows-from-us-foreign-assets-and-liabilities.html.
121
See Tax Treaties Hearing, supra note 6, at 4 (statement of Patricia A.
Brown, Deputy International Tax Counsel (Treaty Affairs), U.S. Department of
the Treasury).
122
See U.S. MODEL TAX CONVENTION, supra note 27, arts. 10–12; see also
see also Pamela A. Fuller, The Japan-U.S. Income Tax Treaty: Signaling New
Norms, Inspiring Reforms, or Just Tweaking Anachronisms in International Tax
Policy?, 40 INT’L LAW. 773, 794 (2006) (“The U.S. Government’s objectives for
withholding rates, as reflected in the U.S. Model Tax Treaty, are zero percent on
royalties and most categories of interest, and 5 percent on dividends received by
corporate shareholders holding directly at least 10 percent of voting stock of the
payor.”).
123
See Fuller, supra note 122, at 794–95.
124
See id. at 796 (discussing the difficulty in distinguishing royalties from
business profits).
125
See id. at 795.
120
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eliminated those disputes. 126 Finally, the United States exports intangibles; 127 royalty flows always favor the United States. 128
Ideally, the United States would also like to eliminate all withholding taxes on interest, subject to certain anti-abuse rules. 129 If it
cannot do so, the fallback position is to eliminate or at least reduce
the gross-basis taxation of types of interest that would constitute
business profits, such as interest received by financial institutions.130
The United States also tries to eliminate withholding taxes on investment income earned by tax-exempt pension funds because such
taxes inevitably result in economic double taxation. 131
The U.S. position with respect to dividends changed about
twenty years ago. 132 Prior to that, the United States position was to
follow the OECD Model on dividends, providing for a five percent
direct dividend rate 133 and a fifteen percent portfolio dividend
rate. 134 The Treasury Department only reconsidered this position in
See id. at 794–95
See REUVEN S. AVI-YONAH, INTERNATIONAL TAX AS INTERNATIONAL
LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF THE INTERNATIONAL TAX REGIME 44 (2007) (“The place
of use rule is favorable to the source country which may be surprising because the
United States is a net exporter of intangible property”); Mariano Municoy, Allocation of Jurisdiction on Patent Disputes in the Models Developed by Hague Conference in Private International Law: Asymmetric Countries and the Relationships of Private Parties, 4 CHICAGO-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 342, 376–77 (2005).
128
OLENA DUDAR ET. AL., CTR. FOR EUROPEAN ECON. RES., THE IMPACT OF
TAXES ON BILATERAL ROYALTY FLOWS 2 (2015).
129
See U.S. MODEL TAX CONVENTION, supra note 27, art. 11 ¶1; Fuller, supra
note 122, at 797–99; Tax Treaties Hearing, supra note 6, at 4, 10 (statement of
Patricia A. Brown, Deputy International Tax Counsel (Treaty Affairs), U.S. Department of the Treasury).
130
See Fuller, supra note 122, at 797; Tax Treaties Hearing, supra note 6, at
13 (statement of Patricia Brown, Deputy International Tax Counsel (Treaty Affairs), U.S. Department of the Treasury).
131
OECD MODEL TAX CONVENTION, supra note 7, art. 18 cmt. ¶ 69.
132
See generally ROBERT H. DILWORTH ET AL., PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS
LLP, ZERO WITHHOLDING ON DIRECT DIVIDENDS: POLICY ARGUMENTS FOR A
NEW U.S. TREATY MODEL 1113–31 (2000) (arguing for the U.S. to change its position with respect to dividends).
133
The United States preferred to apply the direct dividend rate at a ten percent
ownership threshold rather than the twenty-five percent threshold in the OECD
Model. Compare U.S. MODEL TAX CONVENTION, supra note 27, art. 10, with
OECD MODEL TAX CONVENTION, supra note 7, art. 10.
134
U.S. MODEL TAX CONVENTION, supra note 27, art. 10, ¶ 2; see also
DILWORTH ET AL., supra note 132.
126
127
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order to conclude an agreement with the United Kingdom. 135 At the
time, the United Kingdom was in the process of reforming its corporate tax system, including through the repeal of its advance corporation tax (“ACT”). 136 The corporate reform would have two major effects with respect to the United States. First, the ACT served
to prevent treaty-shopping into the United States through U.K. companies, as the ACT was to be paid even if a U.K. company had no
mainstream corporate tax liability (for example, because the company could use foreign tax credits from foreign investment to offset
the U.K. corporate tax liability). 137 Second, the United States agreed
in 1975 to a complicated treaty provision that provided certain benefits to U.S. shareholders with respect to the U.K.’s imputation system for taxing corporate profits. 138 This provision, criticized by
Charles Kingson in his article “The Coherence of International Taxation” as effectively a tax-sparing provision, 139 by 1999 required the
U.S. to provide a foreign tax credit for a tax that never was paid. 140
Accordingly, the United States wanted several things out of the re135
RICHARD LUGAR, TAX CONVENTION WITH THE UNITED KINGDOM, S.
EXEC. RPT. NO. 108-2, at 5 (2003).
136
See id. at 7 (discussing the repeal of ACT by the U.K. and the effect on
treaty negotiations between the U.S. and U.K.).
137
See Shawn Carson & Richard Blum, Changes to the U.K. Partial Imputation System, 20 INT’L TAX J. 47, 51–52 (1993) (describing how reliefs in the form
of foreign tax credits can be used to reduce the mainstream corporate tax).
138
Convention Between the Government of the United States of America and
the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland for
the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income and Capital Gains, U.K.-U.S., arts. 10, 23, Dec. 31,
1975, 31 U.S.T. 5668.
139
Charles I. Kingson, The Coherence of International Taxation, 81 COLUM.
L. REV. 1151, 1215 (1981).
140
See Rev. Proc. 2000-13, § 3.02, 2000-1 C.B. 515 (“A portfolio investor
making this election will be treated as having received an additional dividend
equal to the gross amount of the tax credit (unreduced by amounts withheld), and
as having paid the withholding tax due under Article 10, on the date of the distribution. Thus, the investor must include in income the gross payment deemed received, and may claim a foreign tax credit under Article 23 for the withholding
tax treated as paid to the United Kingdom.”); see also S. EXEC. REP. NO. 108-2,
at 7 (“However, in order to account for the recent repeal of the U.K. advance
corporation tax and related developments, the proposed treaty also eliminates a
provision of the present treaty requiring the United States to provide a foreign tax
credit with respect to certain dividends received from U.K. companies.”).
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negotiation of the tax treaty; 141 the U.K. wanted just one—the elimination of the withholding tax on dividends paid by subsidiaries to
their parent companies. 142
The Treasury essentially concluded that there is no single “right”
rate when it comes to dividends. 143 This realization allows negotiators to be very pragmatic in terms of dealing with other countries. In
addition, because the U.S. Model Income Tax Convention continued
to follow the OECD version of Article 10 with respect to the basic
treatment of direct and portfolio dividends, 144 the United States effectively acquired a new bargaining chip to be used in negotiations,
as other countries asked the United States to go to zero. 145 Although
it took some time to figure out why, it appears that governments
were influenced by their multinational corporations. 146 For many of
those multinationals, the United States is the most important foreign
market. 147 On the other hand, while U.S. companies favor zero dividends generally, no foreign market is as important to them as the
United States is to other countries. 148
By making this concession, the United States was able to
achieve a number of important goals over the next few years. In the
U.S.-U.K. Treaty, the United States was able to achieve a modern
treaty with a “limitation on benefits” provision, 149 override of the
See S. EXEC. REP. NO. 108-2, at 6–8 (discussing the benefits the U.S. would
receive from giving the U.K. a zero-withholding rate).
142
See id. at 5–8 (discussing the benefits of the treaty for the U.K.).
143
See id. at 8 (discussing how the zero-rate provision must be looked at on a
case-by-case basis before deciding on a proper rate for each future U.S. tax treaty).
144
Compare U.S. MODEL TAX CONVENTION, supra note 27, art. 10, with
OECD MODEL TAX CONVENTION, supra note 7, art. 10.
145
See Tax Treaties Hearing, supra note 6, at 3 (statement of Patricia A.
Brown, Deputy International Tax Counsel (Treaty Affairs), U.S. Department of
the Treasury) (“The provision dealing with inter-company dividends was very important to Sweden.”).
146
Cf. DILWORTH ET AL., supra note 132 (discussing how dividend rates allow
for multinational companies to be more competitive in the U.S. and foreign markets).
147
See Kingson, supra note 139, at 1172 (“[T]he United States has recently
become the ‘favorite site’ for investments from other industrialized countries . . .”).
148
See id.
149
Convention Between the Government of the United States of America and
the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland for
141
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domestic tax interest requirement in the information exchange article, 150 an anti-conduit rule applicable in particular to the waiver of
the insurance excise tax, 151 and a resolution of a dispute over the
proper way to allocate interest expense to permanent establishments
of foreign financial institutions. 152
In exchange for the elimination of withholding taxes on intercompany dividends, Australia agreed to unprecedented reductions
in the withholding tax rates on interest and royalties, 153 which was
followed by Japan agreeing to reductions in withholding taxes on
interest and the elimination of the withholding tax on royalties. 154
The Netherlands, whose treaty with the United States already eliminated the withholding taxes on interest and royalties, 155 agreed to a
new limitation on benefits provision that included anti-inversion

the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital Gains, U.K.-U.S., art. 23, July 24, 2001,
T.I.A.S. No. 13,161.
150
See id. art. 27.
151
Id. art. 7, ¶ 5.
152
Exchange of Letters Between the United Kingdom and United States, Convention Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland for the
Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect
to Taxes on Income and on Capital Gains, U.K.-U.S., July 24, 2001, T.I.A.S. No.
13,161.
153
Tax Convention with the United Kingdom (T. Doc. 107-10) and Protocols
Amending Tax Conventions with Australia (T. Doc. 107-20) and Mexico (T. Doc.
108-3): Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 108th Cong. 21
(2003) (statement of David Noren, Legislation Counsel, Joint Committee on Taxation).
154
The Japanese Tax Treaty (T. Doc. 108-14) and the Sri Lanka Tax Protocol
(T. Doc. 108-9): Hearing before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 108th Cong.
4 (2004) (statement of Barbara M. Angus, International Tax Counsel, United
States Department of the Treasury).
155
See Protocol Amending the Convention Between the United States of
America and the Kingdom of the Netherlands for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Double Taxation with Respect to Taxes on Income,
Neth.-U.S., art. 10, Mar. 8, 2004, S. TREATY DOC. No. 108-25; see also 2004
Treaties Hearing, supra note 4, at 4 (statement of Barbara M. Angus, International
Tax Counsel, United States Department of the Treasury).
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rules. 156 And Belgium overrode its bank secrecy rules. 157 Although
this run of treaty re-negotiations no doubt provided significant benefits to the United States, it also meant that few resources were available to expand the U.S. tax treaty network.
B.
Political Factors Affecting U.S. Tax Treaty Policy
Tax treaties receive very little attention in the U.S. mainstream
press, particularly as compared to trade agreements, which are much
more controversial. 158 Tax treaties have also been negotiated by
both Democratic and Republican administrations in roughly equal
numbers. 159 If there is a difference between political parties, it is
largely a matter of nuance.
Traditionally, Republican administrations have placed an emphasis on the benefits of globalization, trade, and investment. 160 In
an effort to make U.S. multinationals more “competitive,” their domestic tax policy has focused on providing lower corporate rates and
exempting foreign business profits from U.S. taxation. 161 In the tax
treaty context, this translates to reducing source country taxation by
lowering or eliminating gross-basis withholding taxes on passive income and maintaining high thresholds for taxation of business income. Anti-treaty-shopping provisions, primarily the U.S. limitation
on benefits provision, are therefore intended to create leverage to
lower withholding rates. After many years, Canada’s agreement to

2004 Treaties Hearing, supra note 4, at 4 (statement of Barbara M. Angus,
International Tax Counsel, United States Department of the Treasury).
157
Treaties: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 110th Cong.
5 (2007) (statement of John Harrington, International Tax Counsel, Department
of the Treasury) (explaining the strengthening of the information exchange article
requiring Belgium to provide the U.S. with bank information).
158
See generally Patrick Driessen, Is There a Tax Treaty Insularity Complex?
TAX NOTES TODAY INT’L 745, 745–54 (May 28, 2012).
159
See Jason R. Connery et al., Current Status of U.S. Tax Treaties and International Tax Agreements, TAX MGMT. INT’L J. (Nov. 29, 2019),
https://tax.kpmg.us/content/dam/tax/en/pdfs/2019/update-us-treaties-statustmij.pdf (listing the dates U.S. tax treaties were entered into).
160
See REPUBLICAN NAT’L COMM., 2016 REPUBLICATION PARTY PLATFORM
2
(2016),
https://prod-cdn-static.gop.com/media/documents/DRAFT_12_FINAL[1]-ben_1468872234.pdf.
161
See id.
156
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accept the elimination of source-country withholding taxes on interest 162 can be seen as a validation of this policy.
On the other hand, Democratic administrations have shown
more concern about the dangers of globalization. 163 Democrats have
been much more concerned about tax arbitrage and tax evasion.164
In the treaty context, these foci are reflected not so much in the terms
of agreements, which are fairly consistent with prior practice, but in
treaty negotiating priorities. For example, the Clinton Administration was very focused on re-negotiating old treaties to expand information exchange on request and update anti-treaty-shopping provisions. 165 The Obama Administration produced the 2016 U.S. Model
Income Tax Convention, 166 which was more focused on the risk of
double non-taxation than prior U.S. model treaties or actual U.S. tax
treaties. 167 The 2016 Model Income Tax Convention includes a
number of provisions, including rules on “special tax regimes,” that
Protocol Amending 1980 Tax Convention with Canada with Respect to
Taxes on Income and on Capital, Can.-U.S., art. 6, Sep. 21, 2007, S. TREATY DOC.
No. 110-15 (2008) [hereinafter Protocol with Canada] (amending Article 11 of
the Convention).
163
See DEMOCRATIC NAT’L COMM., 2016 DEMOCRATIC PARTY PLATFORM 12
(2016),
https://democrats.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/2016_DNC_Platform.pdf.
164
See id.
165
See Bilateral Tax Treaties and Protocol: Estonia–Treaty Doc. 105-55; Latvia–Treaty Doc. 105-57; Venezuela–Treaty Doc. 106-3; Denmark–Treaty Doc.
106-12; Lithuania–Treaty Doc. 105-56; Slovenia–Treaty Doc. 106-9; Italy–
Treaty Doc. 106-11; Germany–Treaty Doc. 106-13: Hearing Before the S. Comm.
on Foreign Relations, 106th Cong. 9, 16 (1999) [hereinafter 1999 Bilateral Tax
Treaties and Protocol] (statement of Philip R. West, International Tax Counsel,
Department of the Treasury).
166
See generally U.S. MODEL TAX CONVENTION, supra note 27.
167
Compare Preamble to the U.S. MODEL TAX CONVENTION, supra note 27,
(“The Government of the United States of America and the Government of
__________, intending to conclude a Convention for the elimination of double
taxation with respect to taxes on income without creating opportunities for nontaxation or reduced taxation through tax evasion or avoidance (including through
treaty-shopping arrangements aimed at obtaining reliefs provided in this Convention for the indirect benefit of residents of third states), have agreed as follows”),
with Preamble to DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, U.S. MODEL INCOME TAX
CONVENTION (2006) (“The Government of the United States of America and the
Government of -----, desiring to conclude a Convention for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income,
have agreed as follows”).
162
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are aimed at flattening corporate structures by reducing the utility of
intermediary companies. 168 However, these provisions have not
been included in any signed U.S. tax treaty. 169 Treasury officials
have indicated that they are developing a new U.S. Model. 170 However, it remains unclear which of these provisions will be included
in that Model.
The Trump Administration’s international tax policy is a mix of
traditional Republican and Democratic policy goals. As in past Republican administrations, there is a stated goal of making U.S. multinationals more “competitive,” by lowering rates and exempting
(some) foreign business profits. 171 However, an emphasis on repatriation of intangible property, profits, and runaway plants 172 is more

For a general description of the provisions of the 2016 U.S. Model, see
Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Full Circle? The Single Tax Principle, BEPS and the New
U.S. Model, GLOBAL TAX'N, May 2016, at 12, 17–20 (2016); U.S. MODEL TAX
CONVENTION, supra note 27, arts. 3, 10, 11, 12, 12, 21 and 28.
169
The most recent tax treaty signed by the United States is a proposed treaty
with Vietnam, which was signed in 2015. See Connery et al., supra note 159, at
4. It does not include the rules on “special tax regimes,” “expatriated entities” or
“subsequent changes in law.” See Agreement Between the Government of the
United States of America and the Government of the Socialist Republic of Viet
Nam for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion
with Respect to Taxes on Income arts. 3, 10, 11, 12 and 21, Viet.-U.S., July 7,
2015,
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/treaties/Documents/Treaty-Vietnam-7-7-2015.pdf [hereinafter Viet.-U.S. Treaty].
170
Letter from David Kautter, Assistant Sec’y of the Treasury (Tax Policy),
Dep’t of the Treasury to Robert Menendez, U.S. Sen. (June 12, 2019) [hereinafter
Letter from Kautter to Menendez].
171
See REPUBLICAN NAT’L COMM., supra note 160, at 2.
172
See Press Release, Treasury Dep’t, Unified Framework for Fixing Our Broken Tax Code (Sept. 27, 2017), https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Documents/Tax-Framework.pdf (press release from the Treasury Department and Congressional Republicans laying out goals for tax reform, including
“[e]nding incentives to ship jobs, capital, and tax revenue overseas”); Press Release, U.S. Congressman Lloyd Doggett, Whitehouse, Doggett Call for Action on
Tax Haven Bill in Wake of Paradise Papers (Nov. 7, 2017), https://doggett.house.gov/media-center/press-releases/whitehouse-doggett-call-action-taxhaven-bill-wake-paradise-papers (describing proposed legislation that “would
limit the ways corporations can game the U.S. tax system by moving jobs and
assets abroad.”).
168
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consistent with past Democratic concerns, as is a focus on base erosion and tax arbitrage. 173 There is a continued desire to discourage
inversions while encouraging foreign investment in the United
States. 174
Because no tax treaty has been signed during the Trump Administration, 175 any discussion of tax treaty policy is mostly conjecture. In the absence of newly-signed agreements, the best indication
of the Trump Administration’s view may be the fact that it actively
supported the tax agreements that were pending before the Senate
when President Trump took office. 176 Those agreements were consistent with U.S. tax treaty policy as developed over many years.

173
Compare U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE
ADMINISTRATION’S REVENUE PROPOSALS 144–46 (1998), https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/General-ExplanationsFY1999.pdf (explaining the Clinton Administration’s proposal to “address tax
avoidance through use of hybrids”), with Certain Related Party Amounts Paid or
Accrued in Hybrid Transactions or with Hybrid Entities 26 U.S.C. § 267A (2018)
(enacted in 2017 as part of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Pub. L. 115-97).
174
CONG. RESEARCH SERVICE, ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE
TAXATION: THE 2017 REVISION (P.L. 115-97), at 29 (2019),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R45186.pdf.
175
The last bilateral tax treaty signed by the United States was with Vietnam
on July 7, 2015. See Connery et al., supra note 159, at 4. The United States has
not signed the Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty Related
Measures to Prevent Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, which first opened for signature on June 6, 2017. See Signatories and Parties to the Multilateral Convention
to Implement Tax Treaty Related Measures to Prevent Base Erosion and Profit
FOR
ECON.
CO-OPERATION
AND
DEV.,
Shifting,
ORG.
https://www.oecd.org/tax/treaties/beps-mli-signatories-and-parties.pdf (last updated Jan. 23, 2020).
176
Because U.S. tax treaty policy has been relatively consistent over the years,
it is generally the case that an incoming administration, even of a different party,
supports tax treaties negotiated by prior administrations. That is not a foregone
conclusion, however. In 1981, the incoming Reagan Administration requested the
return of treaties with the British Virgin Islands and Cyprus over concerns about
treaty shopping. S. COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, RETURN OF TWO TAX
TREATIES, S. EXEC. REP. NO. 97-43, at 3 (1981).
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Two of those agreements—protocols with Switzerland 177 and Luxembourg 178—primarily addressed information exchange for tax purposes. 179 The pending treaties with Hungary 180 and Poland 181 would
add 182 anti-treaty-shopping provisions, a goal of multiple administrations. Two protocols, with Japan 183 and Spain, 184 were updates
of existing treaties with important treaty partners, resulting in important reductions in withholding rates. 185 Only one agreement, with
Chile, would represent a new tax treaty relationship. 186 The Treasury Department’s support for these agreements suggests that the
Trump Administration’s tax treaty policy may be reasonably conventional.

Protocol Amending Tax Convention with Swiss Confederation, Switz.U.S., Oct. 2, 1996, S. TREATY DOC. No. 112-12 (2019).
178
Protocol Amending Tax Convention with Luxembourg, Lux.-U.S., May
20, 2009, S. TREATY DOC. No. 111-8 (2019).
179
The protocols were approved by the Senate on July 17, 2019. Id.; Protocol
Amending Tax Convention with Swiss Confederation, supra note 177. They entered into force on Sep. 20, 2019 and Sep. 9, 2019, respectively. See Press Release,
U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Treasury Welcomes Entry into Force of Tax Protocols
with Luxembourg and Switzerland (Sep. 20, 2019), https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm781.
180
Tax Convention with Hungary, Hug.-U.S., Feb. 4, 2010, S. TREATY DOC.
No. 111-7 (2017).
181
Tax Convention with Poland, Pol-U.S., Feb. 13, 2013, S. TREATY DOC. No.
113-5 (2017).
182
These treaties have not yet been approved by the Senate, as discussed infra
Section IV.B.3. See Annagabriella Colón, A Look Ahead: Prospects Unclear for
U.S. Tax Treaties in 2020, TAX NOTES INT’L, Jan. 6, 2020, at 23, 23–24
183
Protocol Amending the Tax Convention with Japan, Japan-U.S., Jan. 24,
2013, S. TREATY DOC. No. 114-1 (2019).
184
The Protocol Amending the Tax Convention with Spain, Spain-U.S., Jan.
14, 2013, S. TREATY DOC. No. 113-4 (2019).
185
The protocol with Spain was approved by the Senate on July 16, 2019. Id.
The protocol with Japan was approved on July 17, 2019. Protocol Amending the
Tax Convention with Japan, supra note 183. The treaties entered into force on
Nov. 27, 2019 and Aug. 30, 2019, respectively. See Press Release, US. Dep’t of
the Treasury, Treasury Announces Action on Tax Protocols with Two Key Trading Partners (Aug. 30, 2019), https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm763.
186
Tax Convention with Chile, Chile-U.S., Jan. 24, 2013, S. TREATY DOC.
No. 112-8 (2017) [hereinafter Chile-U.S. Convention]. This treaty has not yet
been approved by the Senate, as discussed in Section IV.B.3.
177
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The Curated U.S. Tax Treaty Network

1. IN GENERAL
As noted above, the United States has fifty-eight comprehensive
bilateral tax treaties in force. 187 Thirty-four of those treaties are with
OECD members and fewer than thirty are with non-OECD members. 188 This is quite small for a developed country. By contrast,
both the United Kingdom 189 and France 190 have well over one hundred treaties in force, while Germany 191 and Spain 192 each have over
ninety. Moreover, seventeen of Spain’s treaties are with LATAM

187
United States Income Tax Treaties – A to Z, supra note 1 (listing all countries with which the United States has tax treaties). In addition to the fifty-eight
comprehensive treaties, the United States has a limited tax treaty with Bermuda
that covers only insurance activities. Convention Between the Government of the
United States of America and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland (on Behalf of the Government of Bermuda) Relating
to the Taxation of Insurance Enterprises and Mutual Assistance in Tax Matters,
U.K.-U.S., July 11, 1986, T.I.A.S. No. 11,676. Its application has been further
limited by a Congressional override that reinstated the application of the federal
excise tax on insurance policies issued by Bermudan insurance companies with
respect to U.S.-situs risks, which had been waived by the treaty. Technical and
Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-647, § 6139, 102 Stat. 3342,
3724 (1988).
188
Compare List of OECD Member Countries – Ratifications of the Convention on the OECD, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV.,
https://www.oecd.org/about/document/list-oecd-member-countries.htm (last visited Dec. 27, 2019), with United States Income Tax Treaties – A to Z, supra note
1 (listing all countries with which the United States has tax treaties).
189
See United Kingdom - Treaty Withholding Rates Table, Int’l Bureau for
Fiscal Documentation, (accessed Jan. 15, 2020).
190
See France - Treaty Withholding Rates Table, Int’l Bureau for Fiscal Documentation, (accessed Jan. 15, 2020).
191
See Germany - Treaty Withholding Rates Table, Int’l Bureau for Fiscal
Documentation, (accessed Jan. 15, 2020).
192
See Spain - Treaty Withholding Rates Table, Int’l Bureau for Fiscal Documentation, (accessed Jan. 15, 2020).
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countries 193 (even more than the United Kingdom) 194 despite
Spain’s significantly smaller treaty network. France has eleven treaties 195 and Germany has nine 196 with LATAM countries. Interestingly, China also has just over one hundred tax treaties, including
nine with LATAM countries. 197
It would be very easy for the United States to have a much larger
tax treaty network. The United States receives many requests from
other countries to negotiate tax treaties every year. 198 Most requests
go through an initial three-step evaluation:
(a) Is there double taxation or other issues that can
only be resolved through a treaty? 199
See id. Spain is a party to tax treaties with Argentina, Barbados, Bolivia,
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Jamaica, Mexico, Panama, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, and Venezuela.
Id.
194
The United Kingdom has tax treaties or tax treaty-like relationships with
Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Chile, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, Mexico, Panama, St. Kitts and Nevis, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, and Venezuela. See United Kingdom - Treaty Withholding Rates Table, supra note 189. The United Kingdom also has an income tax arrangement with the
Cayman Islands, which applies primarily to business profits and the income of
individuals, but does not affect treaty withholding rates. See Income Tax Treaty,
U.K.-Cayman Is., June 15, 2019, Int’l Bureau for Fiscal Documentation, (accessed Jan. 26, 2020).
195
See France - Treaty Withholding Rates Table, supra note 190. France has
tax treaties with Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Jamaica, Mexico,
Panama, St. Maarten, Trinidad and Tobago, and Venezuela. Id.
196
See Germany - Treaty Withholding Rates Table, supra note 191. Germany
is a party to tax treaties with Argentina, Bolivia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Jamaica,
Mexico, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, and Venezuela. Id.
197
See China Treaty Withholding Rates Table, Int’l Bureau for Fiscal Documentation, (accessed Jan. 15, 2020). China has tax treaties with Barbados, Brazil,
Chile, Cuba, Ecuador, Jamaica, Mexico, Trinidad and Tobago, and Venezuela. Id.
198
Bilateral Tax Treaties and Protocol: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 105th Cong. 8 (1993) (statement of Joseph H. Guttentag, Assistant
Secretary for International Tax Affairs, Department of the Treasury) (“The Department of the Treasury receives regular and numerous requests to enter tax
treaty negotiations. As a result it has been necessary for us to establish priorities.”).
199
See id. (“Another priority is to conclude treaties or protocols that are likely
to provide the greatest benefits to United States taxpayers, such as when economic
relations are hindered by tax obstacles.”).
193
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(b) Is there sufficient trade and investment to justify
a treaty? 200
(c) Are there any deal-breakers? 201
These are considered in more detail in the remainder of this Section.
a.
Issues that Need to be Resolved by Treaty
The preceding Sections described some of the reasons why a tax
treaty may be necessary even if each of the treaty partners includes
provisions in their domestic laws that relieve double taxation.202
Differences in characterization and source can be resolved through
general or customized provisions, 203 although it is true that the
OECD Model does little to address those issues. 204 The primary incentive for a new tax treaty almost always will be the prospect of
reducing “excessive” withholding taxes—those gross basis withholding taxes that result in the recipient being taxed more heavily
than if it had paid tax on a net basis in either Contracting State. 205
The countries that do not satisfy this threshold typically are those
that do not have a generally applicable income tax. The United
States will not usually enter into a tax treaty if there is no possibility
See id. (“We also try to conclude treaties with countries that have the potential to be significant trading partners.”).
201
See Bilateral Tax Treaties and Protocol: Hearing on Treaty Docs. 105-55,
105-57, 106-3, 106-12, 105-56, 106-9, 106-11, 106-13 Before the S. Comm. On
Foreign Relations, 106th Cong. 16 (1999) (statement of Philip R. West, Int’l Tax
Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury) (“Information exchange is one of the handful
of issues that we discuss with the other country before beginning formal negotiations because it is one of a very few issues that we consider non-negotiable . . . .
A second aspect of U.S. tax treaty policy to deal with avoidance and evasion is to
include in all treaties comprehensive provisions designed to prevent ‘treaty shopping.’).
202
See supra Part II.
203
See DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, TECHNICAL EXPLANATION ACCOMPANYING
THE UNITED STATES MODEL INCOME TAX CONVENTION OF SEPT. 20, 1996, at 1–2
(1996) (explaining that the Model is only a starting point and negotiations with
countries will lead to different, custom provisions).
204
See generally OECD MODEL TAX CONVENTION, supra note 7.
205
See Pending Bilateral Tax Treaties and OECD Tax Convention: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 101st Cong. 47 (1990) (statement of
Frank Kittredge, President, National Foreign Trade Council).
200
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of double taxation as between the two countries. 206 One effect of this
policy was the 1984 notice of termination of the extension of the
1945 U.K.-U.S. tax treaty to the United Kingdom’s overseas territories, many of them in the Caribbean, and the United States’ refusal
to enter into replacement treaties with many of those countries. 207
This policy also means that the United States does not have tax
treaties with countries in the Gulf Cooperation Council (“GCC”)—
Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab
Emirates (“U.A.E.”) 208—despite significant amounts of U.S. investment in those countries. 209 While some GCC countries now impose
corporate taxes, in several cases those taxes are imposed only on
foreign enterprises (Kuwait), 210 the oil and gas industry (Bahrain), 211 oil and gas and foreign banks (U.A.E.), 212 resident companies and permanent establishments of foreign enterprises (Saudi

206

Protocol Amending the Tax Convention with Spain: Hearing on Treaty
Doc. 113-4 Before the S. Comm. On Foreign Relations 113th Cong. (2014) (statement of Robert Stack, Deputy Assistant Secretary (International Tax Affairs),
U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury) (“With certain countries there simply may not be the
type of cross-border tax issues that are best resolved by a treaty. For example, if
a country does not impose significant income taxes, or imposes tax on a strictly
territorial basis (that is, it exempts not only dividend income but all foreign source
income from taxation by reason of its foreign source), there is little possibility of
unresolved double taxation of cross-border income, given the fact that the United
States provides foreign tax credits to its citizens and residents regardless of the
existence of an income tax treaty. Under such a circumstance, it would not be
appropriate to enter into a comprehensive tax treaty with that particular country
because doing so would result in a unilateral concession of taxing rights by the
United States.”).
207
See Omri Marian, Unilateral Responses to Tax Treaty Abuse: A Functional Approach, 41 Brook. J. Int'l L. 1157, 1171 (2016), available athttp://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/facultypub/765.
208
Cf. See United States Income Tax Treaties – A to Z, supra note 1 (listing
all of the countries with which United States has a tax treaty).
209
See Table 1-o: United States, supra note 113 (listing the United States as
investing $423 million in Bahrain, $296 million in Kuwait, $1.8 billion in Oman,
$8.2 billion in Qatar, $11.1 billion in Saudi Arabia, and $16.8 billion in U.A.E.).
210
Kuwait - Corporate Taxation - Country Tax Guides, Int’l Bureau for Fiscal
Documentation, (accessed Jan. 15, 2020).
211
Bahrain - Corporate Taxation - Country Tax Guides, Int’l Bureau for Fiscal Documentation, (accessed Jan. 15, 2020).
212
Although there is a theoretical corporate tax on entities in all sectors, in
practice taxation is limited to the oil and gas and financial sector. See United Arab
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Arabia), 213 or income arising in that country (Qatar). 214 Thus, a tax
treaty is unlikely to provide much relief from host State taxation in
those countries. The primary effect of such treaties would be to reduce U.S. withholding taxes on investment income earned by residents of the other States. While some countries will enter into tax
treaties to provide incentives for inward investment, 215 the United
States does not.
b.

Is There Sufficient Trade and Investment to Justify a
Tax Treaty?
A much more difficult hurdle for most developing countries to
overcome is the issue of whether there is sufficient trade and investment to justify a treaty. 216 This consideration by itself disqualifies
many African countries, for example, where the amount of U.S. outward investment is in the low millions.217
It is hard to define how much trade and investment is “enough”
to justify a tax treaty. The United States signed a tax treaty with Vietnam in 2015, 218 where the current stock of U.S. outward foreign
Emirates - Corporate Taxation - Country Tax Guides, Int’l Bureau for Fiscal Documentation, (accessed Jan. 15, 2020).
213
Saudi Arabia - Corporate Taxation - Country Tax Guides, Int’l Bureau for
Fiscal Documentation, (accessed Jan. 15, 2020).
214
Qatar - Corporate Taxation - Country Tax Guides, Int’l Bureau for Fiscal
Documentation, (accessed Jan. 15, 2020).
215
France, for example, has entered into tax treaties that eliminate most
source-basis withholding taxes with all of the GCC countries. See France – Treaty
Withholding Rates Table, Int’l Bureau for Fiscal Documentation, (accessed Jan.
15, 2020). Because those countries do not impose withholding taxes or, generally,
tax their own residents on foreign source income, the treaties are not primarily to
prevent double taxation. It can be assumed, therefore, that the purpose is to encourage investment in France by GCC investors. See Eric M. Zolt, Tax Treaties
and Developing Countries 72 TAX L. REV. (forthcoming) for a general discussion
of tax treaties as investment incentives.
216
See OECD MODEL TAX CONVENTION, supra note 7, art. 27 cmt. ¶ 1 (discussing what negotiating states need to consider before entering a treaty, including
the trade and investment flows).
217
See Table 1-o: United States, supra note 113 (listing outward investment
of the United States).
218
Viet.-U.S. Treaty, supra note 169; see also United States and Vietnam Sign
First Income Tax Treaty, ERNST & YOUNG LLP (July 15, 2015),
https://www.ey.com/gl/en/services/tax/international-tax/alert--united-states-andvietnam-sign-first-income-tax-treaty.
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direct investment was about two billion dollars at the end of 2017. 219
Countries with the lowest amount of U.S. outward foreign direct investment with which the United States nevertheless has tax treaties
are Latvia ($71 million), 220 Estonia ($72 million), 221 and Lithuania
($154 million). 222 Those treaties represent a special circumstance,
however, as those countries took the position that they were not covered by the tax treaty between the Soviet Union and the United
States because they were occupied countries. 223 Accordingly, there
was some pressure to negotiate new agreements to cover investments in those countries that were made before the break-up of the
Soviet Union. 224 Moreover, the three countries negotiated treaties
together, as their treaty policies were quite similar. 225 Currently, the
real foreign direct investment position with respect to those countries is now close to three hundred million dollars. 226
After the Baltic States, the lowest in terms of stocks of investment from the United States are Jamaica ($167 million), Sri Lanka
See Table 1-o: United States, supra note 113 (listing the outward investment of the U.S. in Vietnam as two billion dollars).
220
See Convention Between the United States of America and the Republic of
Latvia for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion
with Respect to Taxes on Income, Lat.-U.S., Jan. 15, 1998, S. TREATY DOC. No.
105-57 (1998); Table 1-o: United States, supra note 113.
221
See Convention Between the United States of America and the Republic of
Estonia for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income, Est.-U.S., Jan. 15, 1998, S. TREATY DOC.
No. 105-56 (1998); Table 1-o: United States, supra note 113.
222
See Convention Between the United States of America and the Republic of
Lithuania for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income, Lith.-U.S., Jan. 15, 1998, S. TREATY DOC.
No. 105-55 (1998); Table 1-o: United States, supra note 113.
223
Lawrence Juda, United States’ Nonrecognition of the Soviet Union’s Annexation of the Baltic States: Politics and Law, 6 J. BALTIC STUDIES 272, 274
(1975); Peep Kalamäe, Baltic States – United States Treaty Status, TAX NEWS
SERVICE 344, 344 (1995).
224
See 1999 Bilateral Tax Treaties and Protocol, supra note 165, at 21 (statement of Philip R. West, International Tax Counsel, Department of the Treasury)
(explaining the competitive disadvantage for U.S. buinesses in the Baltics due to
their competitors having tax treaties with them already, decreasing taxation on
their operations).
225
See id. at 35 (prepared statement of Lindy Paull, Chief of Staff of Joint
Comm. on Taxation).
226
See Table 1-o: United States, supra note 113 (totaling outward investment
between Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania at $297 million).
219

396

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74:359

($168 million), Tunisia ($279 million), Slovenia ($369 million),
Ukraine ($398 million), and Morocco ($412 million). 227 The other
U.S. tax treaty counterparts below $1 billion of U.S. outward investment are Bangladesh ($460 million), Pakistan ($518 million), Malta
($601 million)—however, Maltese FDI in the United States is almost $1.6 billion228—and Bulgaria ($848 million). 229
As a result, it can be assumed that the minimum amount of U.S.
foreign direct investment to be “sufficient” is no more than somewhere between $150 million and $300 million. If so, there are a
number of LATAM countries that currently do not have tax treaties
with the United States that would satisfy the threshold. These include Argentina ($14.9 billion), Aruba ($190 million), Bahamas
($23.3 billion), Bolivia ($598 million), Brazil ($68 billion), Cayman
Islands ($331 billion), Chile ($26 billion), 230 Colombia ($7.2 billion), Costa Rica ($2 billion), Dominican Republic ($2 billion), Ecuador ($981 million), El Salvador ($3 billion), Guatemala ($1 billion), Honduras ($1.4 billion), Nicaragua ($187 million), Panama
($4.7 billion), Paraguay ($179 million), Peru ($6.3 billion), St. Kitts
and Nevis ($612 million), St. Lucia ($357 million), and Uruguay
($1.6 billion). 231
Over the decades, the Treasury Department’s tax treaty efforts
in LATAM have focused on Brazil 232 and Argentina. 233 Tax treaty
negotiations with Colombia have taken place, 234 but it is unclear
where they stand. The Treasury Department perhaps should broaden
Table 1-o: United States, supra note 113.
Table 1-i: United States, supra note 113.
229
Table 1-o: United States, supra note 113.
230
See Chile-U.S. Convention, supra note 186; see also infra Part IV.B.3.
231
Table 1-o: United States, supra note 113.
232
See BRAZ.-U.S. BUS. COUNCIL, U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, A
ROADMAP TO A U.S.-BRAZIL TAX TREATY 1 (2019), https://www.brazilcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/Roadmap-U.S.-Brazil-Tax-Treaty_1.pdf
(“For decades the U.S. and Brazil, the two largest economies and democracies in
the Western Hemisphere, have attempted to lay the groundwork for a bilateral tax
treaty (BTT)”).
233
See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Remarks by U.S. Treasury
Secretary Lew at Meeting with Argentine Finance Minister Prat-Gay (Sep. 26,
2016), https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl5060.aspx.
234
See Sarah Carpenter, Colombia, U.S. Negotiating Tax Treaty, TAX NOTES
INT’L, Oct. 10, 2016, at 153, 153.
227
228
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its view. The six parties to the Dominican Republic-Central American Free Trade Agreement (Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala,
Honduras, Nicaragua and the Dominican Republic) 235 together host
almost ten billion dollars of U.S. foreign direct investment, 236 suggesting that a joint negotiation similar to that with the Baltics could
be a useful way forward. Peru, Ecuador, Bolivia, and even Paraguay
could also be considered.
c. Are There Any Deal-Breakers?
Once the Treasury Department determines that a new treaty relationship will provide sufficient benefits, it then determines
whether there are any deal-breakers that would prevent the successful conclusion of an agreement. 237 The primary issues that have prevented negotiations with developing countries in the past have been
(1) the U.S.’s insistence on including a “limitation on benefits” provision to prevent treaty-shopping, (2) an information exchange provision that overrides both bank secrecy and “domestic tax interest”
requirements, and (3) the inability of the United States to agree to a
“tax-sparing” provision. 238 While the OECD has made significant

See CAFTA-DR (Dominican Republic-Central America FTA), OFFICE OF
U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-tradeagreements/cafta-dr-dominican-republic-central-america-fta (last visited Dec. 27,
2019).
236
See Table 1-o: United States, supra note 113.
237
See generally U.S. MODEL TAX CONVENTION, supra note 27, at 1 (discussing the polices behind the U.S. Model Income Tax Treaty).
238
See DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, EARNINGS STRIPPING, TRANSFER PRICING
AND U.S. INCOME TAX TREATIES 73, 78–80 (2007), https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/Report-Earnings-Stripping-Transfer-Pricing-2007.pdf (explaining the need to prevent treaty-shopping through the inclusion of limitations on benefits provisions); Reuven Avi-Yonah, If Not Now,
When? U.S. Tax Treaties with Latin America After TCJA, 2019 INT’L TAX J. 51,
51 (2019) (discussing how the United States refuses to grant tax sparing provisions, leading countries to decline to enter treaties with the United States).
235
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progress on the issues of treaty-shopping 239 and exchange of information 240 for tax purposes, some countries, such as Brazil, may still
take the position that any reduction in source-State taxation must be
accompanied by a tax-sparing provision. 241 Unless these issues can
be resolved, the United States generally will not move forward.
IV. HOW DIFFICULT CAN IT BE?
Although the United States has a relatively small tax treaty network, 242 the network includes a number of countries that are significantly less important to the U.S. economy than many of the countries of Latin America. 243 This Part will first discuss, as a general
matter, whether the U.S. policies create irreconcilable differences.
It will then focus on three case studies that may provide some lessons for the future in order to determine whether that limited treaty
network is inevitable.

239
See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., PREVENTING THE
GRANTING OF TREATY BENEFITS IN INAPPROPRIATE CIRCUMSTANCES, ACTION 6
2015
FINAL
REPORT
17–20
(2015),
https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/9789264241695-en.pdf?expires=1577475586&id=id&accname=guest&checksum=66BE62630086EC0207E2D132B8EF1F22.
240
See OECD MODEL TAX CONVENTION, supra note 7, art. 26, ¶¶ 4–5.
241
See BRAZ.-U.S. BUS. COUNCIL, supra note 232, at 3 (noting that Brazil has
signed tax treaties with Singapore and Switzerland that do not include tax sparing
credits). However, those tax treaties with Singapore and Switzerland are not yet
in force. See Brazil - Treaty Withholding Rates Table, Int’l Bureau for Fiscal
Documentation, (accessed Jan. 8, 2020).
242
See United States Income Tax Treaties – A to Z, supra note 1 (listing all of
the countries with which United States has a tax treaty).
243
See, e.g., Top U.S. Trade Partners: Ranked by 2017 Total Import Value for
Goods (in Millions of U.S. Dollars), U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE (2017),
https://www.trade.gov/mas/ian/build/groups/public/@tg_ian/documents/webcontent/tg_ian_003364.pdf (showing Chile, Colombia, Argentina, and Peru as being among the top trade partners of the U.S.).
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A.

Is U.S. Tax Treaty Policy the Problem? (Reluctance
Revisited)
The most important recurring theme in this Article has been the
goal of the United States, particularly in treaties with other developed countries, to reduce withholding rates to the extent possible.244
This desire is usually inconsistent with the goals of developing
countries. 245 It has been said that “[t]he developing country partners
often [have] conflicting objectives [which] are attracting U.S. capital and technology, while, at the same time, preserving scarce revenues.” 246 To put it more bluntly: “Developing countries badly need
both to attract foreign capital and to raise revenue by taxing that
capital; but the more they tax, the less they attract.” 247
Eduardo Baistrocchi posits that developing countries resolve
this dilemma by signing tax treaties that look like the OECD and
U.N. Models because of strong network effects that allow for “competition within a compatible standard.” 248 That is, once a basic technology is in place, competitors can differentiate themselves through
features that appeal to different customers. 249
The use of the OECD Model as a template for an actual treaty
provides for a common understanding of terms that are identical to
those in the OECD Model. 250 What seems less understood is that the
use of language that differs from the OECD Model clearly indicates
See 2014 Treaties Hearing, supra note 70 (statement of Nancy L.
McLernon, President & CEO Organization for International Investment).
245
See Kingson, supra note 139, at 1159–60 (discussing the goals of countries
like Brazil and how those goals tend to conflict with those of the United States).
246
Tax Conventions With: The Russian Federation, Treaty Doc. 102-39;
United Mexican States, Treaty Doc. 103-7; The Czech Republic, Treaty Doc. 10317; The Slovak Republic, Treaty Doc. 103-18; and the Netherlands, Treaty Doc.
103-6. Protocols Amending Tax Conventions With: Israel, Treaty Doc. 103-16;
The Netherlands, Treaty Doc. 103-19; and Barbados, Treaty Doc. 102-41: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 103th Cong. 19 (1993) (statement
of Leslie B. Samuels, Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy, Department of the Treasury).
247
Kingson, supra note 139, at 1159.
248
Eduardo Baistrocchi, The Use and Interpretation of Tax Treaties in the
Emerging World: Theory and Implications, 2008 BRIT. TAX REV. 356, 358–60
(2008).
249
See id. (explaining that a compatible standard allows competitors to focus
their efforts on “non-agreed dimensions”).
250
See OECD MODEL TAX CONVENTION, supra note 7, at I-1, ¶¶ 2–3.
244
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that the parties reject the result that would be provided by the OECD
Model and, in some cases, also the U.N. Model. The use of the
OECD Model template facilitates the negotiation of treaties that deviate because the use of standard language for the majority of the
treaty, to which both parties agree, 251 allows the negotiators to
spend more time on the issues where their positions diverge. 252
Arguments that treaties based on the OECD Model are bad for
developing countries 253 therefore miss the point that most developing countries are not entering into treaties that are identical to the
OECD Model. 254 Wim Wijnen and Jan de Goede have directed a
research project that catalogs the prevalence of various provisions
found in the U.N. Model that occur in 1,811 treaties entered into
between 1997 and 2013. 255 Although some provisions occur more
often than others, their research suggests that developing countries
have a fair amount of bargaining strength to achieve results that are
important to them. For example, of the 1,811 treaties studied, 1,579
See id. at I-4 (discussing the purpose of the OECD Model Convention).
Of course, standard language has also developed with respect to some common deviations from the OECD Model, again because of the network benefits of
using standardized language.
253
See, e.g., Dagan, supra note 71, at 939 (“In this Article, I show that these
ubiquitous treaties are not necessary for preventing double taxation. Rather, they
serve much less heroic goals, such as easing bureaucratic hassles and coordinating
tax terms between the contracting countries, and much more cynical goals, particularly redistributing tax revenues from the poorer to the richer signatory countries.”). However, in contrast to Kingson’s article, supra note 139, at 1210–62,
which discusses specific provisions of specific tax treaties with which he disagreed, Dagan’s article, supra, cites to no actual tax treaties. In their discussion of
the model tax treaties and developing nations, Kim Brooks and Richard Krever
also cite only to secondary sources, although those sources occasionally cite to
actual treaties. See generally Kim Brooks & Richard Krever, The Troubling Role
of Tax Treaties, in 51 TAX DESIGN ISSUES WORLDWIDE 159–78, (Geerten M. M.
Michielse & Victor Thuronyi eds., 2015).
254
Compare OECD MODEL TAX CONVENTION, supra note 7l, with Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion
with Respect to Taxes on Income, Braz.-India, arts. 12–15, Apr. 26, 1988,
https://www.incometaxindia.gov.in/pages/international-taxation/dtaa.aspx
(1992) (differing from the OECD Model in the taxation of royalties and other
forms of income).
255
See Wim Wijnen & Jan de Goede, The UN Model in Practice 1997-2013,
68 BULL. INT’L TAX’N 118, 118 (2014); see also Willem F.G. Wijnen & Marco
Magenta, The UN Model in Practice, 51 BULL. INT’L FISCAL DOCUMENTATION
574, 574 (1997).
251
252
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(approximately 87%) allowed the source State to tax royalties. 256 Of
the treaties between an OECD member and non-OECD member,
85% allowed for taxation of royalties by the source State. 257 As between two non-OECD members, 94% of treaties provide for taxation of royalties by the source State, while only 72% of treaties between two OECD members did so. 258 Moreover, 42% of the treaties
included a rule expanding the definition of a permanent establishment to include the furnishing of services in a source State for a
specified period (most often six months, but sometimes as low as
one month). 259 Again, the adoption rate for this provision was highest (58%) among treaties between two non-OECD members, but still
significant (35%) in treaties between an OECD member and a nonOECD member, and between two OECD members (17%). 260 Although the percentage of treaties adopting other provisions is frequently lower than for these examples, such alternative provisions
still occur in hundreds of treaties. 261
The fact that these provisions occur at relatively high rates both
in treaties between two OECD member countries and two nonOECD member countries suggests that another common assumption
is flawed. Commentators frequently argue that treaties between
OECD members are “reciprocal” or “symmetric,” 262 which explains
why countries are willing to reduce source State taxation. On the
other hand, treaties between OECD members and non-OECD members are “asymmetric.” 263 If things were that simple, one would not

Wijnen & de Goede, supra note 255, at 129–30.
Id.
258
Id.
259
Id. at 122.
260
Id.
261
For example, 1,234 treaties out of the sample include a modification to the
definition of “royalties” that allows the source State to tax rental payments relating to the leasing of equipment. Id. at 130.
262
See Baistrocchi, supra note 248, at 357 n.8 (“The symmetric tax treaty network refers to tax treaties in which there are approximately equal investment
flows between contracting states. Tax treaties concluded between developed
countries (such as the US-UK tax treaty) or between developing countries (such
as the Argentina-Brazil tax treaty) are examples of symmetric tax treaties.”).
263
See id. at 353 (“The asymmetric tax treaty network consists of bilateral tax
treaties concluded between developed and developing countries. The word ‘asym256
257
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expect 72% of treaties between two OECD members 264 to provide a
positive withholding rate on royalties.
Wijnen and de Goede note that they make a simplifying assumption by distinguishing between OECD and non-OECD countries as
proxies for developed and developing countries. 265 There are “resource rich” countries that, while not members of the OECD, are
also not developing countries as defined by the World Bank. 266
Moreover, some “emerging market” countries are significant capital
exporters as well as capital importers. 267
Even those observations do not reflect the complexity of bilateral economic relationships. Baistrocchi described the United States
as having thirty-four asymmetric treaties (those with non-OECD
countries) and twenty-nine symmetric treaties (those with other
OECD member States). 268 However, comparing stocks of inward
and outward foreign direct investment shows that even fewer U.S.
treaties are symmetric. 269 For example, France’s FDI in the United
States was close to three times the amount of U.S. FDI in France as
of the end of 2017. 270 The Japan-to-United States ratio was about

metric’ denotes unequal investment flows between contracting states: while developing countries normally are capital importers, developed countries habitually
are capital exporters.”).
264
See Wijnen & de Goede, supra note 255, at 129–30.
265
See id. at 119.
266
Id.
267
Id.
268
See Baistrocchi, supra note 248, at 356. Baistrocchi was writing in 2008,
before Estonia, Israel, Latvia, Lithuania, and Slovenia became members of the
OECD. See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., OECD ANNUAL REPORT
2008, at 115 (2008), https://www.oecd.org/newsroom/40556222.pdf (listing the
thirty member countries of the OECD in 2008); Where: Global Reach, ORG. FOR
ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., https://www.oecd.org/about/members-and-partners/ (last visited Dec. 22, 2019) (listing all current OECD member countries and
the year joined, including Estonia, Israel, Latvia, Lithuania, and Slovenia). Presumably, U.S. tax treaties with those countries, which fell into the “asymmetric”
category at the time of his writing, became “symmetric” when they joined the
OECD, demonstrating the essential meaninglessness of this categorization.
269
Compare Table 1-i: United States, supra note 113, with Table 1-o: United
States, supra note 113.
270
Compare Table 1-i: United States, supra note 113, with Table 1-o: United
States, supra note 113.
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the same. 271 Both Germany and Spain had about twice the amount
of FDI in the United States as the amount of U.S. FDI into those
countries. 272 Eight other OECD member States—Australia, Austria,
Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Italy, and Sweden 273—were
roughly symmetrical, frequently with the other OECD country’s
FDI in the United States exceeding U.S. FDI into that State. 274 The
bilateral FDI relationships with the other twenty-three OECD members were asymmetric in favor of the United States, some to a striking degree. 275
Examining FDI stocks for some other OECD members provides
further evidence that the OECD/non-OECD assumption oversimplifies. For example, Argentina’s stock of FDI in Mexico was $2.5 billion as of the end of 2017, 276 while Mexico’s reciprocal position in
Argentina was $661 million, 277 the opposite of what would be predicted. On the other hand, Brazil’s FDI position in Mexico was $906
million,278 while Mexico’s position in Brazil was $9.5 billion,279 in
line with the assumption. Similarly, Mexico’s FDI position in Colombia was $4.9 billion, 280 almost five times that of Colombian FDI
in Mexico. 281 Mexico’s FDI position in Chile was $2.7 billion,282
Compare Table 1-i: United States, supra note 113, with Table 1-o: United
States, supra note 113.
272
Compare Table 1-i: United States, supra note 113, with Table 1-o: United
States, supra note 113.
273
See Where: Global Reach, supra note _ (listing the current OECD members and the year each country ratified the OECD Convention).
274
Compare Table 1-i: United States, supra note 113, with Table 1-o: United
States, supra note 113.
275
Compare Table 1-i: United States, supra note 113, with Table 1-o: United
States, supra note 113.
276
Table 1-i: Inward Direct Investment Positions, as of end-2017: Reporting
Economy: Mexico, INT’L MONETARY FUND, http://data.imf.org/regular.aspx?key=61227424 (last visited Dec. 22, 2019) [hereinafter Table 1-i: Mexico].
277
Table 1-o: Outward Direct Investment Positions, as of end-2017: Reporting Economy: Mexico, INT’L MONETARY FUND, http://data.imf.org/regular.aspx?key=61227424 (last visited Dec. 22, 2019) [hereinafter Table 1-o: Mexico].
278
Table 1-i: Mexico, supra note 276.
279
Table 1-o: Mexico, supra note 277.
280
Id.
281
Table 1-i: Mexico, supra note 276.
282
Table 1-o: Mexico, supra note 277.
271
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almost twice that of fellow OECD-member Chile’s FDI position in
Mexico. 283
Almost all of Chile’s treaties 284 are asymmetric, but in opposite
directions. 285 In general, its treaties with other OECD member countries are asymmetric with Chile being the capital importer. 286 Its
treaties with non-OECD members generally are asymmetric with
Chile being the capital exporter. 287 Chile’s position as both capital
importer and capital exporter was foreseen by those who developed
Chile’s tax treaty policy in the 1990s. 288
It is likely that one of the “emerging market” economies to
which Wijnen and de Goede refer 289 is China, which has introduced
its “Belt and Road” initiative to develop infrastructure in both developing and developed countries. 290 Interestingly, the International
Monetary Fund’s country reports on China show only FDI into
China. 291 To discover where China is investing, it is necessary to
Table 1-i: Mexico, supra note 276.
See Chile - Treaty Withholding Rates Table, Int’l Bureau for Fiscal Documentation, (accessed Jan. 8, 2020).
285
Compare Table 1-o: Outward Direct Investment Positions, as of end-2017:
Reporting Economy: Chile, INT’L MONETARY FUND, http://data.imf.org/regular.aspx?key=61227424 (last visited Dec. 27, 2019) [hereinafter Table 1-i: Chile],
with Table 1-i: Inward Direct Investment Positions, as of end-2017: Reporting
Economy: Chile, INT’L MONETARY FUND, http://data.imf.org/regular.aspx?key=61227424 (last visited Dec. 27, 2019) [hereinafter Table 1-o:
Chile].
286
For example, Australia invests $772 million into Chile, but Chile only invests $37 million into Australia. Compare Table 1-i: Chile, supra note 285, with
Table 1-o: Chile, supra note 285.
287
For example, Chile invests $13.3 billion into Brazil, whereas Brazil only
invests $5.1 billion in Chile. Compare Table 1-o: Chile, supra note 285, with Table 1-i: Chile, supra note 285.
288
See Patricia Brown et al., Insiders’ View of Treaty Negotiations, in REPORT
OF PROCEEDINGS OF THE SIXTY-FIRST TAX CONFERENCE, at 25:5–25:6 (2009).
289
See Wijnen & de Goede, supra note 255, at 119 (“[T]here is an increasing
group of developing countries with emerging economics that have become significant capital exporters.”).
290
See Andrew Chatzky & James McBride, China’s Massive Belt and Road
Initiative, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (May 21, 2019),
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-massive-belt-and-road-initiative.
291
See Table 1-o: Outward Direct Investment Positions, as of end-2017: Reporting Economy: China, INT’L MONETARY FUND, http://data.imf.org/regular.aspx?key=61227424 (last visited Dec. 22, 2019) [hereinafter Table 1-o:
China].
283
284

2020]

HOW HARD CAN THIS BE?

405

look at other countries’ inward investment charts. 292 For example,
Mexico’s charts show about $731 million of FDI from China into
Mexico, 293 with no Mexican FDI into China. 294 Likewise, Chile
shows no FDI from China, 295 and just over $100 million of Chilean
investment into China. 296
Martin Hearson is doing important empirical work that looks at
investment asymmetries to determine how they affect particular provisions of treaties. 297 He determines “that neither investment asymmetry nor power dynamics alone are sufficient to explain the outcome of treaty negotiations.” 298 In fact, Hearson’s review of actual
treaties reveals the following:
much of the conventional wisdom about tax treaty
negotiations is partial at best. The clear trend towards
declining source taxing rights in WHT provisions is
counterbalanced by greater source taxing rights in
other areas. There is important variation across region, development status and type of treaty partner.
Longstanding OECD members are not necessarily
the toughest negotiators with developing countries,
in comparison to emerging economies. 299
A review of the actual terms of U.S. tax treaties is likely to bear
this out. Although the reduction of withholding rates is an important
goal of U.S. tax treaty policy, it is also true that the United States
does not achieve those goals in every tax treaty. 300 Rather, the “hallmark” of U.S. tax treaty policy is “achieving the best deal it [can]
with each treaty partner.” 301 In fact, the majority of U.S. tax treaties

292

285.

293
294
295
296
297
298
299
300
301

See, e.g., Table 1-i: Mexico, supra note 276; Table 1-i: Chile, supra note
See Table 1-i: Mexico, supra note 276.
See Table 1-o: Mexico, supra note 277.
See Table 1-i: Chile, supra note 285.
See Table 1-o: Chile, supra note 285.
See Hearson, supra note 18, at 20–25.
Id. at 24.
Id. at 25.
See Brown et al., supra note 288, at 25:8.
Id. at 25:7.
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continue to provide for a positive withholding rate on royalties.302
This is due in large part to the number of provisions that, from the
U.S. perspective, are non-negotiable. 303 If many provisions are nonnegotiable, concessions will have to be made with respect to other
provisions. While the Joint Committee on Taxation has mused about
whether “developing country concessions” were appropriate with
respect to particular tax treaties, 304 upward deviations from U.S. preferred withholding rates were not raised as issues during the Senate’s review of the U.S. treaties with Japan, 305 Bulgaria, 306 or
Chile. 307

See generally TABLE 1. TAX RATES ON INCOME OTHER THAN PERSONAL
SERVICES UNDER CHAPTER 3, INTERNAL REVENUE CODE, AND INCOME TAX
TREATIES, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. (2019), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irsutl/Tax_Treaty_Table_1_2019_Feb.pdf. Close to forty U.S. treaties provide for
some level of source State taxation with respect to at least some categories of
royalties. Id.
303
See supra Part II.
304
See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, JCX-4-06, EXPLANATION
OF THE PROPOSED INCOME TAX TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE
PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF BANGLADESH 61 (2006), http://www.jct.gov/x-4-06.pdf
(“An issue is whether these developing-country concessions represent appropriate
U.S. treaty policy, and if so, whether Bangladesh is an appropriate recipient of
these concessions.”).
305
See generally STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 108th CONG.,
EXPLANATION OF PROPOSED INCOME TAX TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATE
AND JAPAN (Comm. Print 2004) (discussing a large number of potential issues,
none of which was the 10% general withholding rate on interest).
306
See generally STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 110th CONG.,
EXPLANATION OF PROPOSED INCOME TAX TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES
AND BULGARIA (Comm. Print 2008) (listing only two issues, the treatment of students, trainees, teachers and researchers and whether the rule allowing the provision of services to constitute a permanent establishment was acceptable).
307
See generally STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 113th CONG.,
EXPLANATION OF PROPOSED INCOME TAX TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES
AND CHILE (Comm. Print 2014) (listing two potential issues, treaty-shopping and
exchange of information and collection assistance, but accepting positive withholding rates on interest and royalties).
302

2020]

HOW HARD CAN THIS BE?

B.

407

Three Case Studies

1. BRAZIL.
Brazil and the United States signed a tax treaty in 1967. 308 It was
abandoned 309 after the Senate entered two reservations. 310 The subject of one—a deduction for charitable contributions made to entities in the other State 311—might now be less controversial as it has
been included in treaties with Canada, 312 Israel, 313 and Mexico.314
The other, relating to the extent to which tax treaties should provide
incentives for U.S. investment in Brazil, 315 is still relevant today, as
discussed below.
To understand the problem with the Brazilian treaty, it is necessary to consider a little history. In 1957, the United States signed a
treaty with Pakistan that included a “tax-sparing credit.” 316 There
are several forms of such a credit; in this case, the United States
would have been obligated to give a foreign tax credit against U.S.
tax otherwise due for taxes that Pakistan had forgiven pursuant to an

308

Convention Between the Government of the United States of America and
the Government of the United States of Brazil for the Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect to Taxes on Income, Mar. 13, 1967, Braz.-U.S. in 8 WALTER H.
DIAMOND & DOROTHY B. DIAMOND, INTERNATIONAL TAX TREATIES OF ALL
NATIONS 56, 56 (1976) [hereinafter Braz.-U.S. Convention].
309
Cf. TREATY AFFAIRS STAFF, OFFICE OF THE LEGAL ADVISER, U.S. DEP’T
OF STATE, A LIST OF TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS OF THE
UNITED STATES IN FORCE ON JANUARY 1, 2019, at 49 (2019),
https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/2019-TIF-Bilaterals6.13.2019-web-version.pdf (listing current tax treaties the United States has with
Brazil).
310
S. EXEC. RPT. No. 5, at 1–3 (1968).
311
Id. at 3.
312
See Can.-U.S. Convention, supra note 25, art. XXI.
313
See Protocol Amending the Convention Between the Government of the
United States of America and the Government of the State of Israel with Respect
to Taxes on Income, Isr.-U.S., art. 15-A, May 30, 1980, S. TREATY DOC. No. 9648 (1980).
314
See Mex.-U.S. Convention, supra note 2, art. 22.
315
S. EXEC. RPT. No. 5, at 2.
316
See Convention Between the Government of the United States of America
and the Government of Pakistan for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the
Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income art. XV, Pak.-U.S.,
July 1, 1957, 10 U.S.T. 984 (1957) [hereinafter Pak.-U.S. Convention].
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investment incentive program. 317 Pakistan argued that, absent the
tax-sparing credit, the benefits of the incentive program would accrue to the U.S. government, not to the U.S. investors. 318 While U.S.
business interests were, not surprisingly, in favor of the tax-sparing
credit, opposition was based on the fact that the foreign tax credit
was intended to place investment in the United States by U.S. taxpayers on an equal footing with investment outside the United States
by U.S. taxpayers. 319 The tax-sparing credit would violate that principle by favoring foreign investment. 320 As it turned out, Pakistan
abolished the incentive program so the Senate did not have to take a
firm position, but its discomfort with the provision was clear and it
entered a reservation to a provision that would have provided the
tax-sparing benefits retroactively to two companies. 321
The 1967 Brazil-U.S. treaty did not include a tax-sparing
credit. 322 Instead, the treaty included an investment credit that gave
eligible investors a credit equal to 7% of investments made in Brazil
by U.S. residents. 323 In exchange, Brazil agreed to reductions in its
otherwise-applicable withholding taxes on investment income.324
See Pak.-U.S. Convention, supra note 316, art. XV(1) (“For the purposes
of this credit there shall be deemed to have been paid by a United States domestic
corporation the amount by which such Pakistan taxes (other than the business
profits tax) have been reduced . . . “).
318
Double Taxation Conventions: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Foreign
Relations on Income Tax Convention with Austria; Supplementary Income Tax
Convention with Canada; Supplementary Income Tax Protocol with Japan; and
Income Tax Convention with Pakistan, 85th Cong. 13–14 (1957) (“[O]ther countries had a valid complaint that . . . what they forewent in the way of taxes merely
put something into the United States Treasury instead of encouraging economic
development there.”).
319
See Letter from Stanley S. Surrey, Professor of Law, Harvard Law Sch., to
Carl Marcy, Senator, Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations (Jan. 22, 1958).
320
James R. Hines Jr., Tax Sparing and Direct Investment in Developing
Countries in INTERNATIONAL TAXATION AND MULTINATIONAL ACTIVITY 39, 45–
46 (James R. Hines Jr. ed., 2001) (noting how the Pakistan treaty encouraged foreign investment by American investors at the expense of investment in the United
States).
321
See Mahesh C. Bijawat, Tax Sparing: An Instrument to Retain and Attract
Foreign Capital, 6 J. INDIAN L. INST. 236, 240.
322
See Braz.-U.S. Convention, supra note 308, art. 7.
323
Id.
324
See Technical Memorandum of Treasury Department Concerning United
States-Brazil Income Tax Convention, in Tax Conventions with Brazil, Canada,
317
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The Senate entered a reservation preventing the investment credit
from taking effect, which in turn would have allowed Brazil to revert
to its domestic withholding rates on dividends, interest, and royalties. 325 Accordingly, the treaty would have allowed little in the way
of benefits, which led to its abandonment.
Brazil continues to see a linkage between tax-sparing credits and
reductions in withholding rates. 326 Because the United States cannot
agree to a tax-sparing credit, the possibility of meaningful reductions in withholding rates seems low.
In principle, a treaty that does not reduce withholding rates can
be justified by other benefits, such as establishing thresholds for taxation by the host State. 327 This might be true, for example, in the
case of a country that has expansive domestic rules regarding the
taxation of business profits. However, because Brazil imposes withholding tax on most payments made by Brazilian companies 328 and

and Trinidad and Tobago: Hearing Before S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 90th
Cong. 101, 106 (1967) ( (“If Brazil considers that any modification or amendment
as a result of this paragraph materially and adversely affects the credit allowed by
this article, Brazil may, by giving notice to the United States through diplomatic
channels, treat such modification or amendment as a suspension of the credit under Article 29(6)(b) and suspend the reduced rates for dividends, interest, and
royalties (Articles 12, 13, and 14).”).
325
S. Exec. Rpt. No. 5, at 2 (“It would not be in the best interests of the United
States to encourage investments abroad by this device.”).
326
See Deborah Toaze, Tax Sparing: Good Intentions, Unintended Results, 49
CANADIAN TAX J. 879, 885 (2001) (noting Brazil’s continued insistence on the
inclusion of a tax-sparing provision as one of the major reasons why the U.S. and
Brazil do not have a tax treaty); but see BRAZ.-U.S. BUS. COUNCIL, supra note
232, at 6 (noting that Brazil has recently signed two treaties that do not include
tax-sparing credits).
327
See generally, e.g., Arrangement Between the Government of the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the Cayman Islands for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal
Evasion, June 15, 2009, Int’l Bureau for Fiscal Documentation (including provisions on the taxation of individuals and of business profits, but no reductions of
withholding taxes).
328
Brazil - Corporate Taxation - Country Tax Guides - 7.3.4 Withholding
Taxes, Int’l Bureau for Fiscal Documentation, (accessed Jan. 16, 2020).
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limits deductions with respect to payments of interest 329 and royalties, 330 it generally does not seek to expand the definition of “permanent establishment,” which could lead to more net basis taxation
rather than the gross-basis withholding taxes that Brazil prefers. 331
In addition, Brazil’s domestic transfer pricing rules do not conform
to the OECD’s arm’s length principle, 332 which is understood to
have been the reason that Germany terminated its treaty with Brazil
in 2005. 333 Accordingly, it is hard to see what benefits to taxpayers
would justify the effort to negotiate a treaty.
2. VENEZUELA
It might seem unlikely to the casual observer that the United
States’ only tax treaty with a South American country is with Venezuela. The explanation is relatively simple—Citgo. The acquisition
of Citgo, a major U.S. petroleum company, by the Venezuelan state
oil company between 1986 and 1990, made the relationship between
the United States and Venezuela less one-sided. 334 Moreover, governments generally prefer not to pay taxes to other governments.
This created an incentive for Venezuela to reduce U.S. withholding
taxes on profit remittances from Citgo.
Still, negotiations had languished over other issues until 1998,
when it appeared that Hugo Chávez would become president of

329
Brazil - Corporate Taxation - Country Tax Guides - 1.4.5 Interest, Int’l
Bureau for Fiscal Documentation, (accessed Jan. 16, 2020).
330
Brazil - Corporate Taxation - Country Tax Guides - 1.4.6 Royalties, Int’l
Bureau for Fiscal Documentation, (accessed Jan. 16, 2020).
331
Sergio André Rocha, Agency Permanent Establishment ‘Brazilian Style’:
Taxation of Profits Earned Through Commission Merchants, Agents and Representatives, 41 INTERTAX 444, 444 (2013) (“This matter is discussed much more
in the international forum and has never aroused much interest on the part of the
Brazilian revenue authorities.”).
332
See Napoleão Dagnese, Is Brazil ‘Developed’? Termination of the BrazilGermany Tax Treaty, 34 INTERTAX 195, 197 (2006).
333
See id. at 195.
334
See Katherine Blunt, Citgo Saga: How the Houston Refiner’s Future Became So Uncertain, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, https://www.houstonchronicle.com/business/energy/article/CITGO-13261273.php (last updated Sept. 30,
2018) (“When Petróleos de Venezuela became the sole owner of Citgo Petroleum
in 1990, the state-owned oil company known as PDVSA was among the largest
and most profitable energy companies in the world.”).
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Venezuela. 335 Negotiations became more urgent, and the treaty was
signed a week before Chávez became president. 336 Although it was
initially unclear whether the new regime would embrace the agreement, the economic arguments in its favor became even stronger after Venezuela announced plans to shift from a territorial to a worldwide tax system starting in 2001. 337
3. CHILE
If the U.S.-Venezuela tax treaty is a story of successfully turning
deadlines into opportunities, the lack of a treaty with Chile can be
largely attributed to bad timing. Until the 1990s, Chile entered into
agreements directly with investors rather than tax treaties with governments. 338 By the mid-1990s, Chile decided on a tax treaty policy
that balanced the reality that it was likely to be a destination for inbound investment by more developed countries with its belief that it
would also be an exporter of capital. 339 Chile’s first treaties after
establishing this policy were with Canada and Mexico in 1998, followed by Ecuador in 1999. 340 That is, negotiations with the United
States were deferred in favor of negotiations with countries that do
not push hard for reductions in withholding rates. Chile affirmatively wished to have as uniform a set of agreements as possible, and

335
See S. EXEC. REP. No. 106-6, at 14–15 (1999) (discussing how the changing political situation in Venezuela was a factor in the U.S.’s willingness to negotiate a treaty).
336
U.S.-Venez. Convention, supra note 2. Chávez became president in February 1999. See Brian A. Nelson, Hugo Chávez: President of Venezuela,
ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/biography/HugoChavez (last visited Dec. 22, 2019).
337
See S. EXEC. REP. NO. 106-6, at 11 (“The Committee is encouraged that
Venezuela is moving from its current territorial tax system to a worldwide tax
system. The new worldwide tax system is expected to be more similar to that of
the United States and, thus, would be more consistent with one of the principal
purposes of the treaty—to avoid double taxation.”).
338
See Brown et al., supra note 288, at 25:5.
339
Id.
340
See OECD, THE REPUBLIC OF CHILE: STATUS OF LIST OF RESERVATIONS
NOTIFICATIONS
AT
THE
TIME
OF
SIGNATURE
2-4,
AND
http://www.oecd.org/tax/treaties/beps-mli-position-chile.pdf (last visited Dec. 22,
2019).
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so it offered to include most-favored nation provisions in its treaties. 341
Even though negotiations began towards the end of the Clinton
Administration, 342 they could not be concluded until Chile’s laws
allowed for the exchange of bank information for tax purposes.343
The treaty was signed on February 4, 2010. 344 Because of this delay
in completing negotiations, the Chile treaty fell into the Senate
limbo created by Senator Rand Paul’s hold on tax treaties. 345
The ability of a single U.S. Senator to cause the U.S. tax treaty
program to come to a halt is not intuitive. Under the U.S. Constitution, the Senate must give advice and consent to the ratification of
treaties, including tax treaties. 346 That approval must be by “two
thirds of the Senators present.” 347 In general, treaties are reviewed
by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee based on a technical
analysis done by the Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation and
then voted on in a business meeting. 348 Senators are then asked if
they have any objections to the treaties being approved by “unanimous consent”—a process that avoids the need for debate on the
Senate floor. 349 This process had worked relatively smoothly for
decades. 350 However, it also allowed Rand Paul to hold up the tax
See Press Release, Chilean Tax Administration, Int’l Bureau for Fiscal
Documentation News, MFN Clauses in Chilean Tax Treaties with Argentina,
Australia, France, Sweden and Uruguay (July 11, 2019).
342
Robert Goulder, U.S. Enters Tax Treaty Negotiations with Chile, TAX
NOTES TODAY INT’L (Jan, 25, 2000), https://www.taxnotes.com/tax-notes-todayinternational/treaties/us-enters-tax-treaty-negotiations-chile/2000/01/25/1bwjk.
343
These changes were made in December 2009. See ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., TAX CO-OPERATION 2010: TOWARDS A LEVEL PLAYING
FIELD 50 (2010), https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/taxation/tax-co-operation2010_taxcoop-2010-en#page1.
344
See Chile-U.S. Convention, supra note 186.
345
Diane Ring, When International Tax Agreements Fail at Home: A U.S. Example, 41 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1185, 1198-99 (2016).
346
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
347
Id.
348
See About Us: Other, JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, https://www.jct.gov/aboutus/other.html (last visited Dec. 22, 2019).
349
Ring, supra note 345, at 1196–97.
350
Treaties: A Historical Overview, U.S. SENATE, https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/briefing/Treaties.htm (last visited Nov. 8, 2019)
(“During its first 200 years, the Senate approved more than 1,500 treaties and
rejected only 21.”).
341
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treaties for a considerable period as Senate floor time is a scarce
commodity. 351
Finally, in the summer of 2019, Senate Majority Leader Mitch
McConnell decided to move forward a number of tax agreements
that had been pending for, in some cases, close to a decade. 352 However, in the second piece of bad timing for Chile, there was a new
wrinkle around changes that had been made to U.S. domestic law by
the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act. 353 This law included a number of
provisions that were potentially inconsistent with U.S. tax treaty obligations. 354 In particular, there were questions regarding the Base
Erosion Anti-Abuse Tax (“BEAT”). 355 Under the “later in time”
principle, a statute can override an earlier treaty, and vice versa. 356
There is debate over whether the BEAT overrides the non-discrimination provisions of existing treaties. 357 In any case, the Treasury
Department obviously was nervous about the possibility that treaties
that enter into force after the BEAT was enacted could override the
BEAT. 358 Accordingly, they asked Senate Democrats to enter a reservation to pending treaties (including the treaty with Chile) to “clarify” that the BEAT would apply under those treaties. 359 Instead,
Treasury’s request was made public. 360 Four protocols to existing
treaties that ostensibly do not present the issue moved forward and

See Ring, supra note 345, at 1197.
Jim Tankersley, Senate Approves Tax Treaties for First Time In Decade,
N.Y. TIMES (July 17, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/17/business/taxtreaties-vote.html.
353
Natalie Olivo, After Nearly 10 Years, Tax Treaties May Face More Delays,
LAW360 (Aug. 2, 2019), https://www.law360.com/corporate/articles/1183525.
354
See H. David Rosenbloom & Fadi Shaheen, The TCJA and the Treaties,
TAX NOTES TODAY INT’L 1057, 1057–58 (Sept. 9, 2019).
355
See H. David Rosenbloom & Fadi Shaheen, The BEAT and the Treaties,
TAX NOTES INT’L 53, 53, 56 (Oct. 1, 2018).
356
Id. at 56 (“When an irreconcilable conflict is found, the provision that is
later in time generally controls.”).
357
Id. at 59.
358
See Olivo, supra note 353.
359
See Letter from Robert Menendez, U.S. Senator, to Steven T. Mnuchin,
Sec’y of the Treasury, Dep’t of the Treasury (June 11, 2019) (“All we know at
this point is that the Department would like to see the reservation applied to the
treaties with Chile, Hungary, and Poland.”).
360
Id.
351
352
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were approved by the Senate. 361 Three full treaties, which squarely
present the issue, were consigned once again to limbo. 362 Press reports indicate that Senator McConnell’s decision to allocate floor
time to the tax treaties might have been motivated by a potential
investment in Kentucky by a Spanish company, and therefore a desire to approve the pending protocol with Spain. 363 This suggests
that (a) no tax treaty will move forward until the Treasury Department addresses the issue directly, through treaty provisions or protocols, and (b) future treaties should be presented in bundles that
generate substantial interest in the business community (preferably
benefitting projects in Kentucky).
CONCLUSION
The world is a complicated place. Countries have very different
views of their national interests, and those views are more nuanced
than outside observers can begin to understand. It is therefore folly
to make general statements about what is in the interests of developing countries or of any subset of developing countries.
What is clear is that, even looking only at Latin America, countries have different reasons for not having tax treaties with the
United States. In relatively few cases has a treaty foundered solely
over a desire by one state to have higher withholding rates or a more
expansive host state exercise of taxing rights. In some cases, it has
just been a matter of bad timing for a treaty that generally was consistent with U.S. treaty policies.
The good news is that it therefore should be possible for the
United States to reach agreements with a number of LATAM countries where there is a significant bilateral economic relationship.
However, it might be productive to focus on smaller countries that
have already shown an interest in encouraging investment from the

See Tankersley, supra note 352 (noting that the agreements with Switzerland, Japan, Luxembourg, and Spain were all approved by the U.S. Senate).
362
Olivo, supra note 353 (explaining that the treaties with Chile, Poland, and
Hungry are “unlikely to move through the Senate with the same relative ease” as
the four protocols).
363
See Tankersley, supra note 352 (detailing how Spain-based Acerinox employs 1,500 workers in Kentucky).
361
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United States rather than a “blockbuster” like Brazil, where substantial barriers to an agreement remain.

